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CORNELL LAW -QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXVIII JUNE, 1943 "' NUMBER 4
WARTIME CONTROL OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS
I
THE NISEI - A CASUALTY OF WORLD WAR Ilt
MAURICE ALEXANDRE
At 11:20 P. M. on March 28, 1942, Minoru Yasui, an American-born
Japanese, walked into a police station in the city of Portland, Oregon. Less
than one month later, he was indicted for this act. Although at first blush
this may sound like something which occurred in an Axis 'country, the fact
remains that it happened in the State of Oregon, and resulted from curfew
regulations established .pursuant to authority granted by an executive order
2
issued by the President of the United States and enforced pursuant to a,
statute3 duly enacted by the Congress of the United States.
Brought to trial for violating the curfew restrictions, Minoru Yasui con-
tended that because he was a citizen of the United States, the regulations were
unconstitutional insofar as they applied to him. Yasui's trial ended in his
conviction, the district court having concluded from the evidence that Yasui
had at his majority chosen allegiance to the Emperor of Japan in preference
to American citizenship. 4 Holding the curfew regulations valid as to aliens,
the court during the course of its opinion bitterly attacked their constitution-
ality insofar as they applied to citizens of the United States. Two months
earlier, another court had sustained them.5
tSince this paper was written, the Supreme *Court has unanimously held that the
curfew regulations were constitutional when issued, because of the danger of invasion
existing at that time. The Court expressed no opinion regarding the present or future
validity of any portion of the evacuation program. Hirabayashi v. United States, 11
U. S. L. WEEK 4539 (U. S. 1943); Yasui v. United States, 11 U. S. L. WEEK 4547
(U. S. 1943). [Ed.]1The American-born children of Japanese immigrants are called Nisei-the second
generation. They comprise two-thirds of the 127,000 Japanese in the United States.
Preliminary Report of the Tolan Committee on Evacuation Problems, H. R. REP. No.
-1911, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 16; Tolan Committee Hearings, part 31, 11815.2Exec. Order No. 9066, February 25, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 1407 (1942).
3Pub. L. No. 503, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).4United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 55 (D. Ore. 1942).
GUnited States v. Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657 (W. D. Wash. 1942). Executive Order
No. 9066, the exclusion regulations (see note 11 infra), and Pub. L. No. 503 were like-
wise held to be constitutional. See Ex parte Lincoln Seiichi Kanai, 46 F. Supp. 286, 288
(E. D. Wis. 1942). Hirabayashi and Yasui have filed appeals from their respective
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The evacuation program undertaken by the government raises a number
of extremely interesting and important issues involving wartime civil rights
of American citizens of Japanese- extraction. The purpose of this paper is to
explore the constitutional validity of the curfew and other regulations as
applied to such citizens, as well as the legality and effect of the statute enacted
as an aid to the enforcement of these regulations.
I. CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS
The attack upon Pearl Harbor, of course, was the first of the events lead-
ing to the Yasui trial. On February 19, 1942, the President issued Executive
Order No. 90666 authorizing and directing the Secretary of War and military
commanders designated by him to prescribe military areas from which all
persons might be excluded, and to promulgate regulations concerning the right
of any person to enter, remain in, or leave such areas. The following day the
Secretary of War designated Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, command-
ing general of the Western Defense Command, as the military commander to
carry out the duties imposed by the executive order for that portion of the
United States embraced in the Western Defense Command. Pursuant to such
authority, General DeWitt issued two proclamations establishing military
areas on the west coast from which persons to be designated in subsequent
regulations would be excluded. 7 These proclamations also provided that any
Japanese, German, or Italian alien, or any person of Japanese ancestry, then
resident in the designated areas, who desired to change his place of habitual
residence, was required to execute a change of residence notice.
In order to formulate and effectuate a program of removal and a long range
plan of relocation, maintenance, and supervision of persons to be designated,
the President on March 18, 1942, created the War Relocation Authority.8
Three days later, on March 21, the President approved Public Law No. 503
providing that anyone who violated any regulation issued pursuant to Exec-
convictions. The Ninth Circuit Court has certified the questions raised to the Supreme
Court, which heard argument on May 10 and 11, 1943.67 FED. REG. 1407 (1942). Prior to the issuance of the executive order, the activities
of enemy aliens were regulated primarily by the Attorney General pursuant to Presi-
dential Proclamation Nos. 2525 and 2526 which invoked the operation of the Alien
Enemy Act of 1918 [50 U. S. C., §§ 21 and 24 (1940)]. Executive Order No. 9066
shifted authority to the Secretary of War and gave him power to deal, not only with
enemy aliens, but with all persons within military areas designated by him.
7Public Proclamation No. 1, March 2, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2320 (1942); Public Proc-
lamation No. 2, March 16, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2405 (1942).
8Exec. Order No. 9102, March 18, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2165 (1942). The Western
Defense Command, on March 14, 1942, had created the Wartime Civil Control Admin-
istration to employ designated military personnel and to enlist the cooperation of civilian
agencies in carrying on the evacuation.
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utive Order No. 9066 would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Shortly thereafter,
General DeWitt issued his first curfew proclamation requiring all alien Ger-
mans and Italians, and all Japanese, whether citizen or alien, who resided
within the military areas heretofore designated, to be within their places of
residence between the hours of 8 P. M. and 6 A. M.9 Any person who vio-
lated the regulation was to be subject to immediate exclusion from the desig-
nated areas and to the criminal penalties provided by Public Law No. 503.10
On the same day, General DeWitt issued the first evacuation regulation,
ordering that all persons of Japanese ancestry, alien or non-alien, be excluded
from the designated areas by March 30, 1942.11 It was also provided that
evacuees might obtain permission to proceed to any approved place of their
own choosing beyond the limits of the prohibited zone. 12 Voluntary evacua-
tion was begun, 13 but on March 27, because of resentment against the Japanese
in the areas to which they had chosen to remove, 14 it was ordered to cease until
further notice.'0
On March 30, 1942, another proclamation was issued by General DeWitt
establishing certain classes of persons entitled to obtain exemption from the
curfew and evacuation orders.16 Whereas the new regulation established six
exempt classes for German and Italian aliens, only two of the classes were avail-
able to Japanese persons, citizen and "alien alike.' 7 The same day, the second
9 Public Proclamation No. 3, March 24, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2543 (1942).
'
0 Enemy aliens would, in addition, be subject to immediate apprehension and intern-
ment.
l1Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, March 24, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2581 (1942).
12The Wartime Civil Control Administration instructed the evacuees that they could
receive special permission to proceed to an approved place of their own choosing beyond
the limits of the designated military areas provided that they had completed arrange-
ments for employment and shelter. Any person who had not departed by the prescribed
day was to be evacuated by the Administration and would be provided with transporta-
tion and temporary residence elsewhere. Fourth Interim Report of the Tolan. Committee,
H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 333.
13After the issuance of Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942, persons of
Japanese descent were urged to relocate outside the military zones on their own initiative,
and during February and March, approximately 8,000' responded. See FIRST QUARTERLY
REPORT ON WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY, 2-3.
14See FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT OF WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY, 3.
15Public Proclamation No. 4, March 27, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2601 (1942). The proc-
lamation recited that it was necessary to restrict and regulate the migration "in order
to provide for the welfare and to insure the orderly evacuation and resettlement of
Japanese voluntarily migrating from Military Area No. 1." A press release issued by
Gen. DeWitt stated that the purpose of the order was to protect the Japanese and to
insure that proper shelter awaited them at their designated destination. Press Release,
Wartime Civil Control Administration, March 27, 1942.
'
0 Public Proclamation No. 5, March 30, 1943, 7 FED. REG. 2713 (1942).
17The exempt classes were as follows, only the last two being available to the
Japanese:
(a) German and Italian aliens seventy or more years of age.
1943]
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and third Japanese exclusion orders were issued.'5 These and the subsequent
exclusion orders, however, did not authorize the evacuees to choose new loca-
tions; instead, relocation centers were selected for them. Additional exclusion
orders followed rapidly,19 and evacuation of the Japanese began in earnest.
On May 19, 1942, General DeWitt issued a general detention order.2 This
order provided that all persons of Japanese ancestry, alien and non-alien, then
or thereafter residing within established assembly, reception, or relocation
centers pursuant to exclusion orders of the Western Defense Command head-
quarters, must remain within such centers unless written authority21 to leave
was obtained from such headquarters.22 On June 27, 1942, General DeWitt
(b) In the case of German afid Italian aliens, the parent, wife, husband, child of
(or other person who resides in the household and whose support is wholly de-
pendent upon) an officer, enlisted man or commissioned nurse on active duty in the
Army of the United States (or any component thereof), U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine
Corps, or U. S. Coast 'Guard.
(c) In the case of German and Italian aliens, the parent, wife, husband, child of
(or other person who resides in the. household and whose support is wholly de-
pendeit u on) an officer, enlisted manl or commissioned nurse who on or since
December 7, 1941, died in line of duty with the armed services of the United States
indicated in the preceding subparagraph.
(d) German and Italian aliens awaiting naturalization who had filed a petition
for 'naturalization and who had paid the filing fee therefor in a court of competent
jurisdiction on or before December 7, 1941.
(e) Patients in hospital, or confined elsewhere, and too ill or incapacitated to
be removed therefrom without danger to life.
(f) Inmates of orphanages and the totally deaf, dumb, or blind.
On October 19, 1942, by Public Proclamation No. 13 (7 FED. REG. 8565), two additional
exempt classes were established as follows:
(a) All citizens or subjects of Italy and all aliens who at present are stateless
but who at the time at which they became stateless were citizens or subjects bf Italy.
(b) Aliens of enemy nationalities during their terms of military service in the
armed forces of the United States.
'sCivilian Exclusion Order No. 2, March 30, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 3944 (1942), and
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 3, March 30, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 3945 (1942).
19Up to the present time, 108 exclusion orders have been issued, not including Public
Proclamation No. 1 of the Commanding General of the Alaska Defense Command ex-
cluding from the Territory of Alaska all persons of the Japanese race of greater than
the half blood and all males of, the Japanese race over 16 years of age of half blood.
7 FED. REG. 4859 (1942). It was said as early as May, 1942, that "the forced migration
thus set in motion surpasses anything of a similar character in the history of this Nation."
Fourth Interint Report of the Select Connnittee Investigating National Defense Migra-
tion, H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 1.2 0Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, May 19, 1942, 8 FED. REG. 982 (1942).
2 1The written authority was to set forth the hour of departure, the hour of return,
and the terms and conditions upon which permission to leave was granted,2 2The following day, May 20, 1942, Gen. DeWitt issued Civilian Restrictive Order 2,
approving evacuation by the War Relocation Authority of about 400-persons of Japanese
ancestry from a designated assembly center for private employment in a specified area.
8 FED. REaG. 982 (1943). Such approval was given upon the express condition that all
the evacuees proceed only to the area designated and return to a center specified by the
War Relocation Authority. A number of similar employment evacuation orders followed
rapidly. See 8 FED. REG. 982 et seq. (1943).
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issued Public Proclamation No. 8 designating the territory within all existing
and future relocation centers in the Western Defense Command as military
areas, and imposing similar leave restrictions. 23 By letter dated August 11,
1942, General DeWitt delegated to the Director of the War Relocation Au-
thority the power to authorize applicants to leave such centers. On August
13, 1942, the Secretary of War issued a similar proclamation 24 with respect to
relocation centers outside the Western Defense Command, and providing that
permission to leave such relocation centers could be obtained from the Secre-
tary -of War or the Director of the War Relocation Authority.25
II. POWER TO ISSUE EXCLUSION, CURFEW, AND DETENTION
REGULATIONS
A. Martial Law
The crux of the court's dicta in the Yasui case was that the curfew regula-
tions (and by inference the exclusion and detention regulations) were uncon-
stitutional as applied to citizens of the United States. Referring "to the power
of the military commander to issue regulations binding indiscriminately upon
citizen and alien," the court had this to say :26
"Such power only is tolerated in the first instance if a state of 'martial
law' has been proclaimed by the proper authbrity and in the ultimate only
if the facts prove the existence of the military necessity therefor."
The court, however, was of the opinion that martial law27 had not been estab-
lished on the west coast, and accordingly that the curfew regulations were
invalid insofar as they applied to citizens of the United States.
The power of the military to issue such regulations during the existence of
martial law cannot be open to serious doubt. The Supreme Court has de-
clared28 that the "nature of the power" of the President to call the militia into
service necessarily implies that "there is a permitted range of honest judgment
as to the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, in suppressing
237 FED. REG. 8346 (1942).24 Public Proclamation No. WD 1, August 13, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 6593 (1942).
25See regulations governing leave issued by the War Relocation Authority, 7 FED. REG.
7656 (1942).2GUnited States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 48 (D. Ore. 1942).27Martial law is to be distinguished from "military law" which consists of the rules
and regulations made by the legislative power for the government of persons in the mili-
tary and naval services, and is enforceable at all times regardless of the absence of
emergency. United States v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754, 761 (E. D. N. Y. 1920) ; Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 141 (U. S. 1866). It is also distinguishable from "military govern-
ment" which is the dominion exercised by a general over a conquered state or province.
Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 AtI. 952, 954 (1903).28Sterling Ar. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 399, 53 Sup. Ct. 190, 196 (1932).
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violence and restoring order." It does not follow from this that any action
taken by the military, "no matter how unjustified by the exigency or sub-
versive or private right," is permissible. 29 The contrary, said the Court in
Sterling v. Constantin,;" is well established.31 In that case, although holding
that there was no military necessity to justify interference with the operation
of private oil wells by the state militia, the Supreme Court indicated the rule
governing executive power 32 during martial law. Referring to the decision in
Moyer v. Peabody,3 3 the Court declared :4
"In that case it appeared that the action of the Governor had direct
relation to the subduing of the insurrection by the temporary detention
of one believed to be a participant ......
If "direct relation to the subduing of the insurrection" is the test in the
absence of war, then the rule when war has come surely must be direct, if
not indirect, 35 relation to the subduing of the enemy. In the Moyer case, the
Supreme Court, several years before its decision in Sterling v. Constantin,
had stated that the ordinary use of soldiers in repelling or suppressing an
actual or threatened invasion of, or insurrection in, a state included the killing
of persons who resisted, as well as the milder measure of seizing the bodies
of those whom the governor considered as standing in the way of restoring
peace. And many years before the Moyer case, the Supreme Court, in Luther
v. Borden,3 6 had held that the existence of martial law justified the forcible
291d. at 400, 53 Sup. Ct. at 196 (1932). But cf. United States v. Diekelman,
92 U. S. 520, 526 (1875) "Martial law is the law of military necessity in the actual
presence of war. It is administered by the general of the army, and is in fact his will.
Of necessity it is arbitrary; but it must be obeyed." See also In re Egan, 8 Fed. Cas.
367, No. 4,303 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1866) ; State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519,
77 S. E. 243 (1912) ; Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913) ; Carver v.
United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 361, 385, 386 (1880). But see 3 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED'STATES, (2d ed., 1929) pp. 1591-1592.
30287 U. S. 378, 400, 53 Sup. Ct. 190, 196 (1932).3IReferring to the power of the military during martial law, the Supreme Court in
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849) said at 45: "No more force, however, can
be used than is necessary to accomplish the object. And if the power is exercised for
the purposes of oppression, or any injury wilfully done to person or property, the party
by whom, or by whose order, it is committed would undoubtedly be answerable." See
It re Ezeta, 62 Fed. 972, 1002 (D. Cal. 1894).
32 The Court declared that the executive power of the governor derives from the state
constitution which makes the governor the chief Executive of the state and commander-
in-chief of its military forces, with power to call forth the militia to execute the lavs
of the state, to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, and protect the frontier. In addi-
tion, the constitution requires the governor to cause the laws to be faithfully executed.
33212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235 (1909).
34287 U. S. 378, 400, 53 Sup. Ct. 190, 196. See Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355, 360
(D. Ind. 1935) ; Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934).
35Cf. cases cited in notes 71 et seq. infra.
367 How. 1 (U. S. 1849).
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entry and search of a private house for a person, where there were reasonable
grounds for believing that he was aiding in an insurrection and that he was
concealed in the house. The court stated that such a person might also be
lawfully arrested by the military,3 T and referring to the use of military power
by a state to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by
civil authority, declared :38
"Without the power to do this, martial law and the military array of
the government would be mere parade, and rather encourage attack than
repel it."
In the light of these decisions the conclusion is inescapable that during the
existence of martial law, especially in time of war, the military have the power
to issue, for citizen and alien alike, regulations providing for curfew, exclusion,
or detention.
Whether the imposition of martial rule in the areas affected by such regu-
lations would have been, or is now, justified is a more difficult question.3 9
Although the statement of the majority in the Milligan case 4 0-- "Martial law:
cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and
present, the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes
the civil administration."-has been severely criticized both as being unneces-
sary dictum and as being unsound in principle, 41 the Court was entirely correct
in declaring that the necessity must be actual and present. Unquestionably
the mere declaration of necessity where no necessity actually exists would be
insufficient to justify martial law.42 The test laid down in the Milligan case
that the civil courts must be closed and unable to function certainly should
not be the test.43 On the other hand, it would seem that the mere fact that
the country is at war is not a sufficient basis, without more, for establishing
3 7 See Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 (D. Ind. 1935) ; Despan v. Olney, 7 Fed. Cas.
534, No. 3,822 (D. R. I. 1852).
387 How. 1, 45 (U. S. 1849).39For a good discussion of the scope of review of an executive finding that martial law
is necessary, see CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS, (2d ed. rev., 1941)
180-184.
404 Wall. 2, 127 (U. S. 1866).
41Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 55 HARV.
L. REv. 1253; WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1896).42Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932).4 3 1t seems unthinkable that our government should have to await actual attack and
inability of the civil courts to function before taking precautionary measures. Willoughby
has pointed out that although the fact that the courts are open and undisturbed will in
all cases furnish a powerful presumption that there is no necessity for a resort to martial
law, it should not furnish an irrebuttable presumption. 3 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, (2d ed. 1929) 1602. See the recent case of Ex parte
Qurin 317 U. S. 1, 45, 63 Sup. Ct. 2, 19 (1942) in which the Supreme Court confined
the Milligan case to the peculiar facts therein involved.
1943]
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martial rule.44 Applying the test of imminence of danger of invasion, 45 the
attack on Pearl Harbor would probably have justified imposition of martial
law on the west coast ;46 martial law today might have less justification. One
thing, however, is certain: there has been no express declaration of martial
law in any of the areas in which exclusion, curfew, or detention regulations
have been adopted.47
It has been suggested that Executive Order No. 9066 was a declaration of
"limited," "implied," or "quasi" martial law,48 the inference being that the
regulations were thereby justified. The decision in the Yasui case refers to
"partial martial law" and unhesitatingly labels the concept as a "pernicious
doctrine." The concept is not entirely new, and has been urged in the past
in connection with the asserted powers of a governor during civil disturbances.
It has been contended on behalf of the governor that even when a civil dis-
turbance does not atmount to an insurrection, if the military are called to aid
in restoring order, they may exercise certain powers, not otherwise existing,
'in order to carry out their mission. In Corninoa .wealth ex rel. Wadsworth v.
S]hortall,49 the relator, a private in the state militia, acting pursuant to orders
of his commanding general, shot and killed a person who refused to halt upon
being challenged. The relator was arrested and charged with manslaughter,
whereupon he filed a writ of habeas corpus. It appeared that during a strike,
the Governor of Pennsylvania had called up the militia to restore order upon
request of the county sheriff. In discharging the relator from custody, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared that the governor's order was a
declaration of "qualified martial law" for the preservation of public peace and
order, and not for the "ascertainment or vindication of private rights, or the
other ordinary functions of government." For the latter functions, the opinion
44Cf. Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over M11ilitary Persons under the Articles of
War (1920) 4 MINN. L. Rlv. 79, 81 suggesting that in time of war, the entire United
States might be considered to be within a military zone and subject to martial law.
And see Ex parte Lincoln Seiichi Kanai, 46 F. Supp. 286, 288 (E. D. Wis. 1942).
45,, . . . Congress may lawfully provide for cases of imminent danger of invasion, as
well as for cases where an invasion has actually taken place.... One of the best means
to repel invasions is to provide the requisite, force for action, before the invader himself
has reached the soil." Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 28 (U. S. 1827). See concurring
opinion in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 132 (U. S. 1866).46Martial law was established in Hawaii on December 7, 1941.
47With respect to whether the President may declare martial law, the concurring
opinion in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 142 (U. S. 1866) stated: " . . . martial law ...
is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be
invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of
insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where
ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and private rights."48Fourth Interim Report of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense
Miqration, H. R. REP. No: 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 21, 170.
49206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903).
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stated, the courts and other agencies of the law were still open and no exigency
required interference. The court also said that it was not true that the com-
munity must be either in a state of peace or a state of war. There could be an
intermediate state. Accordingly, the court found that the order to shoot to
kill was not illegal and that the killing was justified by the circumstances.
A contrary view, however, has been taken by other courts. In Bishop v.
Vandercook.60 it appeared that the governor, upon request of the local author-
ities, had called up the militia to aid in putting down disorders arising from
the importation of liquor into Michigan. Defendants, captain and colonel of
the state militia, had ordered that if automobiles along the Dixie Highway
refused to halt when signaled, a log was to be dragged across the highway
in order to stop them. In sustaining a judgment in favor of the owner of a
taxi which was destroyed when it crashed into a log placed on the highway
by defendants, the court rejected the rule of the Shortall case, saying :51
"There is no such thing as 'qualified martial law.' There is no middle
ground, or twilight zone, between government by law and martial rule.
Martial law or rule cannot arise unless and until there is a suspension
of civil power."
The court then held that full martial law had not been declared and that
defendants had exceeded their authority. That plaintiffs might have -been
violating the federal or state prohibition laws, or the state motor vehicle laws,
would not relieve defendants from liability for injuries wantonly planned and
wilfully inflicted.
In United States ex rel. Palmer v. Adams,5 2 a federal court rejected a claim
that limited martial law justified detention of individuals active in fomenting
violence during a strike, and ordered their release. The court, however, recog-
nized that martial law brings into operation a number of powers which are
necessary for effective military rule.53 The Adams and Bishop cases are
undoubtedly correct in holding that all of these powers cannot be exercised
unless martial law in its full sense has been declared. These cases come into
conflict with the Shortall case on the issue as to whether a declaration of partial
martial law permits the exercise of the limited powers necessary "for preserva-
tion of public peace and order." Assuming, arguenda, that the rule of the
Bishop and Adans cases is correct with respect to the gubernatorial power to
60228 Mich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924),
511d. at 309, 200 N. /W. at 281 (1924).
5226 F. (2d) 141 (D. Colo. 1927).
531d. at 144: "If the Governor here had declared martial law, we would have an
entirely different situation. All the rules applicable thereto, which this court and others
are bound to recognize, would come into play."
19431
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declare partial martial law during peacetime, it does not necessarily follow
that the same rule is applicable with respect to the powers of the President
during a war. It is not necessary, however, to justify the issuance of Executive
Order No. 9066 and the exclusion, curfew, and detention regulations by a
doctrine as questionable as partial martial law. Justification may be found
in a more venerable concept-the Presidential war power.54
B. War Pswer
The statement of the court in the Yasui case that the power to issue curfew
regulations is dependent upon the existence of martial law5" is, in the opinion
of this writer, incorrect, for it fails to recognize that the exercise of the Presi-
dent's war powers is not confined to circumstances in which martial law
would be appropriate.
Executive Order No. 906656 recited as the authority57 for its issuance the
authority vested in the President of the United States and Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy, that is, constitutional authority58
The President's powers, apart from statute, have been the subject of con-
troversial debate for many years. Two views of the President's constitutional
powers are open: (1) his powers are purely executive; or (2) in the presence
of emergency and in the absence of congressional action, he may perform any
and all acts necessary to preserve the nation. The first view, held by ex-
President Taft,. 9 would confine the President to the mere execution of con-
54Perhaps the sole difference between the war power and partial martial law is merely
one of terminology.5 5 See note 29 supra.
567 FED. REG. 1407 (1942).
5 7The preamble to Executive Order No. 9066 cites several statutes, but not as a source
of the power exercised.
5SThe following provisions of the Constitution may be treated as comprising the war
power of the President:
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." (Art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
"Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath
or Affirmation :
"'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, pro-
tect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'" (Art. I, § 1, cl. 8).
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United
States .... " (Art. II, § 2, cl. 1).
"... he [the President] shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed...
(Art. II, § 3).
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion .... " (Art.
IV, § 4).
5 9
"The true view of the executive functions is, as I conceive it, that the President
can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant
of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and neces-
sary to its exercise." TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS (1916) 139-140.
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gressional enactments. Thus, the designation of the President as Commander
in Chief would be construed merely as authorizing him to direct the military
operations of the armed forces, and not as a grant of power.6° The second
view, however, has greater support in the decided cases as well as in past
presidential action.61 Directly in point on the question of detention pursuant
to an order of the President is E5k Parte Vallandigham. 62 There, the petitioner,
a citizen of the United States, was arrested during the Civil War by General
Burnside and held for trial before a military commission on the charge of
making seditious speeches in public. Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus,
contending that since he was in neither the military nor naval service, he was
not liable to arrest by the military. In refusing to discharge the prisoner, a
very enlightened Court pointed out that "In time of war, the President is not
above the constitution, but derives his power expressly from the provision of
that instrument declaring that he shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy." 63 Although it is difficult to define what acts are properly within
the scope of the war power, the Court continued, "they must undoubtedly be
limited to such as are necessary to the protection and preservation of the
government and the constitution, which the President has sworn to support
and defend."0 4 Then the Court, in its zeal to support the power of the Presi-
dent, indulged in language somewhat broader than necessary in connection
with the scope of review of presidential action. Said the Court :65
"And in deciding what he may rightfully do under this power where
6ocf. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).
6lWashington, Jefferson, Lincoln, McKinley, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson,
and Franklin D. Roosevelt exercised their constitutional powers for purposes other than
the mere execution of the laws of Congress. See BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE
EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (1921). In this connection, Theodore Roosevelt
wrote in his autobiography:
"The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my administration, next
to the insistence upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve
the plain people was my insistence upon the theory that the executive power was
limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or
imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. My view was that every
executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward
of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and
not to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged
in a napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary
for the Nation would not be done by the President unless he could find some specific
authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty
to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was for-
bidden by the Constitution or by the laws."
0228 Fed. Cas. 874, No. 16,816 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1863), cert. den. 1 Wall. 243 (U. S.
1864).
631d. at 922.
64Ibid.
65ibid"
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there is no express legislative declaration, the President is guided solely
by his own judgment and discretion and is only amenable for an abuse
of his authority by impeachment, prosecuted according to the require-
ments of the constitution." 0
The general l5rinciple was stated to be :67
"The occasion which justifies the exercise of this power exists only
from the necessity of the case; and when the necessity exists, there is a
clear justification of the act." -
The Court also declared that the foregoing view of presidential power "un-
doubtedly implies the right to arrest persons who, by their mischievous acts
of 'disloyalty, impede or endanger the military operations of the government."
Finally, the Court said that this power may be exercised by the military, and
"it is not necessary that martial law should be proclaimed or exist, to
justify the arrest." 68
The war power of the President has been the basis for other types of action. 9
For example, the courts have sustained the power of the President, apart from
statute, to establish maximum prices and rents,70 to requisition 7' or destroy72
66Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7, How. 1 (U. S. 1849) ; Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78,
29 Sup. Ct. 235 (1909) ; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932).
67Ex parte Vallandigham, note 62 supra at 922. Though Vallandigham was convicted
by the military commission and sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war,
the sentence was never carried out due to an order of President Lincoln directing that
Vallandigham be placed beyond the military lines of the Union army. Counsel for
Vallandigham filed a writ of certiorari to obtain review of the proceedings of the military
commission by the Supreme Court, but the application was denied on the ground that a
military commission was not a court within the meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction in such a case. 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1864).
GSThe case is distinguishable from Ex parte Milligan in that: (1) the question dis-
cussed by the majority in the latter case was whether the military commission had juris-
diction to try and sentence Milligan, whereas in the Vallandigham case, the issue was
one of power to arrest and detain temporarily, and, as the Court pointed out at 923,
"Whether the military commission for the trial of the charges against Mr. Vallandigham
was legally constituted and had jurisdiction of the case, is not a question before this
court"; (2) the Milligan case was decided after the war had-ended.69See Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191, 204 (U. S. 1872) : "Proclamations by
the king alone, or by the king by the authority of Parliament, or by the President by
the authority of Congress, or as part of the executive power, embrace an immense range
of subj ects."70See Export Syndicate of Steel Producers, Inc. v. Dilsizan, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 868
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (price schedule establishing maximum price issued pursuant to executive
order declared to have "the force and character of law," and prior contract providing
for price in excess of maximuni held unenforceable) ; Swanee Fabrics, Inc. v. American
Bleached Goods Co., Inc., N. Y. Sup. Ct., July 18, 1942 (108 N. Y. L. J. 148, col. 5)
(dismissing action by seller to recover difference between contract price and maximum
price established pursuant to executive order) ; Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives &
Granting Annuities v. Cincinnati & L. E. Ry., U. S. Dist. Ct. S. D. Ohio, Sept. 19, 1941
(OPA Service, ff 620:9); Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc. v. Eddington Fabrics Corp., 288
N. Y. 467, 48 N. E. (2d) 493 (1942); United States v. Gordin, 287 Fed. 565, 568
(D. Ohio, 1922), aff'd, 9 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) ; United States v. Kraus,
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property, to exact duties upon imports,73 to permit partial commercial inter-
course with the enemy,74 to make contracts binding upon the United States,75
to establish a temporary state government,7 6 to create provisional courts in
ceded territory,77 to maintain a censorship of radio stations, and to close them
down or take them over in order to preserve the nation's neutrality.78 Even
in the absence of war, if the necessity arises, the President has the constitu-
tional power as Chief Executive to take action in the absence of statutory
prohibition. 79 Thus, the President was authorized, without a statute, to appoint
a deputy marshal to protect a Supreme Court Justice whose life had been
threatened, and the killing of an assailant by the marshal was held to be an
33 F. (2d) 406, 409 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929). But cf. In re Riggs, U. S. Dist. Ct. E. D.
Pa., Oct. 28, 1941 (OPA Service, fI 620:10).71United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623 (U. S. 1871) ; Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.
115 (U. S. 1851); Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158 (1879); United States v. McFarland,
15 F. (2d) 823, 826 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), cert. granted, 273 U. S. 688, 47 Sup. Ct. 449
(1927), cert. revoked, 275 U. S. 485, 48 Sup. Ct. 27 (1927) ; The Prize Cases, 2 Black
635, 665 (U. S. 1862) ; Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U. S. 612 (1879). See The Flying Fish,
2 Cranch 170, 176 (U. S. 1804) ;, Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus,
Ohio, 253 Fed. 499, 510 (D. Ohio, 1918); American Economic Mobilizatioa (1942)
55 HAzv. L. Rzv. 427, 516.
In Mitchell v. Harmony, Chief Justice Taney stated (at 133-134) that in order to
justify the taking of private property by an officer to supply his troops, "the danger
must be immediate and impending, or the necessity urgent for the public service, such
as will not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil authority would be too late
in providing the means which the occasion calls for." But cf. 12 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. (1866)
54 (President has no power as Commander in Chief to restore to the former owner
property in the possession of a person claiming under a confiscation sale.)72Cf. Wiggins v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 412 (1867).
73Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 21 Sup. Ct. 762 (1901); Cross v. Harrison,
16 How. 164 (U. S. 1853).74See Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73 (U. S. 1874). Cf. The Orono, 18 Fed. Cas.
830, No. 10,585 (D. Mass. 1812) holding that the President has no power to prohibit
commercial intercourse with any nation, or to revive an expired statute which gave him
such power; The Matilda Lewis, 16 Fed. Cas. 9281 (S. D. N. Y. 1867) declaring illegal
an order of the Secretary of War prohibiting the purchase and sale of livestock intended
for export because not based upon an act of Congress; United States v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 272 Fed. 893 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921), rev. by stip. 260 U. S. 754, 43 Sup. Ct.
91 (1922); 22 OPs. Arr'y GEN. (1898) 13. But cf. United States v. La Compagnie
Franqaise Des Cables T6lbgraphiques, 77 Fed. 495 (S. D. N. Y. 1896).
75See Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105 (1875). Cf. In the Matter of Bethlehem
Steel Corp., National War Labor Board Case Nos. 30, 31, 34 35 (President's war power
is sufficient authority for War Labor Board order directing an employer to enter into a
prescribed contract in settlement of a labor dispute).
7OTexas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 730 (U. S. 1868).
77Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U. S. 260, 29 Sup. Ct. 608 (1909). Cf. Fleming v. Page,
9 How. 603 (U. S. 1850) (President has no power to annex to the United States any
territory which he has invaded and captured.)
7830 O.Ps. ATr'y GEN. (1914) 291, citing In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658
(1890), note 80 infra.
79See letter from the Attorney General to the President of the United States Senate,
dated October 4, 1939, SEN. Doc. No. 133, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939).
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act performed in pursuance of a "law" of the United States.80 It has also
been held that despite the absence of congressional authorization, the Secretary
of the Interior may seize and sell timber removed from public lands, and may
effect a compromise binding upon the United States with the claimant of such
timber."' The President as Chief Executive may also remove a postmaster
from office,12 and as Commander in Chief may 'establish rules having the force
of law for the armed forces.
8 3
The presence of an emergency was recognized by the court in the Ya.d
case.8 4 No inconsistent action had been taken by Congress.8 5 Accordingly,
in the face of the imposing array of precedents established over a period of
many years, it is difficult to understand how the court could have concluded
that there was no authority to issue the curfew order. If such a result was
prompted by the fear that the President might otherwise usurp legislative
powers too extensive to be ignored, such fears may be put to rest. The vigilance
of Congress in taking steps to effectuate its desires is well illustrated by the
act 6 removing the President's recent limitation upon salaries
s
.
8 7
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE
WAR POWER
It is fundamental that the mere existence of war does not place in abeyance
the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 8 It thus becomes neces-
801n re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658 (1890). See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564,
15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).3 lWells v. Nickles, 104 U. S. 444 (1881).82Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).83United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291 (U. S. 1842) ; Gratiot v. United States, 4 How.
80, 117 (U. S. 1846) ; United States v. Symonds, 120 U. S. 46, 7 Sup. Ct. 411 (1887).
Contra: 6 O's. Air'v GEN. (1853) 10.
84At pp. 44-45, the Court declared:
"The areas and zones outlined in the proclamations became a theatre of operations,
subjected in localities to attack and all threatened during this period with a full scale
invasion. The danger at the time this prosecution was instituted was imminent and
immediate. The difficulty of controlling members of an alien race, many of whom,
although citizens, were disloyal, with opportunities of sabotage and espionage, with
invasion imminent, presented a problem requiring for solution ability and devotion
of the highest order."
Although the Supreme Court may treat a presidential finding of imminence of danger
as a non-reviewable political question, it would seem proper for the Court to inquire into
whether such a finding is arbitrary and capricious. See cases cited note 66 supra.85See discussion of Pub. L. No. 503 infra.86Pub. L. No. 34, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 10, 1943).87Exec. Order No. 9250, October 6, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 7871 (1942).
88Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 119 (U. S. 1866) ; United States v. L. Cohen Grocery
Co., 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298 (1921) ; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U. S. 555, 589, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 863 (1935) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.,
251 U. S. 146, 155, 40 Sup. Ct. 106, 107-108 (1919). But cf. Chemical Foundation, Inc.
v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 29 F. (2d) 597, 603 (D. Del. 1928), aft'd, 283 U. S.
152, 51 Sup. Ct. 403 (1931).
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sary to consider to what extent, if any, the exclusion, curfew, and detention
regulations conflict with the requirements of due process and equal protection
established by the Fifth Amendment.8 9
A. Due Process
In determining whether the regulations with regard to exclusion, curfew,
and detention are violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
it is necessary to consider whether such regulations Constitute deprivations of
liberty within the contemplation of the Constitution; and if so, whether such
deprivations have any reasonable basis to justify them.
It is obvious that physical detention is a deprivation of liberty which, in the
absence of justification, is prohibited. 0 Equally without doubt is the conclu-
sion that physical exclusion falls into the same category.91 It was recently
held, however, that a curfew restriction is not such a deprivation of liberty
as would warrant a discharge upon a writ of habeas corpus. 92 Other restric-
tions similar to curfew have likewise been held not to constitute such a re-
straint upon liberty as to require discharge upon habeas corpus.93 It does not
necessarily follow from these cases, however, that a curfew regulation con-
stitutes no restraint upon liberty whatever. Not every restriction upon liberty
can be tested by a writ of habeas corpus,94 and the mere fact that habeas corpus
will not lie does not preclude a person subject to curfew from raising the
contention that his constitutional liberties have been violated. Indeed, it was
pointed out in the Ventura case95 that upon a trial for violation of a curfew
order, the defendant would have the opportunity to assert all constitutional
rights. If, then, exclusion, curfew, and detention operate to deprive persons
of their liberty, are such deprivations repugnant to the Fifth Amendment?
Justice Holmes has said that "what is due process of law depends on
89No question of involuntary servitude is raised since none of the regulations involve
compulsory service. The restrictions upon liberty imposed by the regulations are not,
of course, intended as punishment for a crime. Accordingly, there is likewise no problem
of denial of a jury trial.
9OIn Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 626 (1923), the Court
stated that the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment denoted freedom from "bodily
restraint" as well as other types of freedom.
91See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 23 Sup. Ct. 671 (1903); Frank
Waterhouse & Co. v. United States, 159 Fed. 876, 880 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908) ; United States
v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 646 (1905) ; Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174,
43 Sup. Ct. 24 (1922).
92Ex parte Ventura, 44 F. Supp. 520 (D. Wash. 1942).93For example, in Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 5 Sup. Ct. 1050 (1885) the
Supreme Court refused to discharge an officer of the Navy who had been ordered to
consider himself under arrest, to remain within the limits of the City of Washington,
and to report upon a designated date for trial by a court martial.
94"A mere moral restraint will not support habeas corpus." Van Meter v. Sanford,
99 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
9544 F. Supp. 520, 522 (D. Wash. 1942).
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circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the
situation."96 In construing the requirements of due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the courts have not invalidated every interference with personal
liberty, but have confined themselves to declaring unconstitutional only those
statutes which have arbitrarily interfered with personal liberty. The general
rule has been thus stated :9
"The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with,
under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action
which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State to effect."
In other words, if the legislature exercises its police power for the public wel-
fare in a reasonable manner, individual rights must be subordinated to the
paramount public necessity. Thus, for example, despite interference with
private rights, the courts have sustained state statutes protecting the public
health,98 morals,9 9 and safety.0 ° The right of the Federal government, in the
proper exercise of its constitutional powers, to override individual rights, is
no less than that of the states.' 0 ' In balancing the protection afforded by the
due process clause against an exercise of a constitutional power, the courts
have recognized that the existence of a public emergency, such as war, is an
96Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84, 29 Sup. Ct. 235, 236 (1909).97Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 397, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 626 (1923). Similar lan-
guage appears in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 573-574
(1925).9SRadice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924) (maximum hours of
labor for women); Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486, 36
Sup. Ct. 206 (1916) (ordinance forbidding emission of smoke in certain part of the city) ;
Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U. S. 153, 37 Sup. Ct. 28 (1916) (prohibiting
sale of product as ice cream where it contained less than the required amount of butter
fat) ; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231 (1889) (regulating the
medical profession).99Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1915) (motion pictures);
Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425 (1902) (gambling); Vance v. W. A.
Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 18 Sup. Ct. 674 (1898) (intoxication) ; Stone v. Missis-
sippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1879) (lotteries).
'
00 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88, 17 Sup. Ct. 748 (1897) (elimination of
grade crossing).1 1in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 510-511 (1934), the
Supreme Court said:
"The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as
respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare.
They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing that the end
shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of
due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be, unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained ... the reasonableness of each
regulation depends upon the relevant facts." See also Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S.
264, 41 Sup. Ct. 41 (1920).
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important element in determining the reasonableness of legislative or admin-
istrative action. Thus, in Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Ca., 02 in
sustaining the constitutionality of a federal price control statute enacted dur-
ing World War I, and an executive order implementing the statute, the
Supreme Court said :103
"The principal purpose of the Lever Act was to enable the President
to provide food, fuel and other things necessary to prosecute the war
without exposing the government to unreasonable exactions. . . . As
applied to the coal in question, the statute and executive orders were not
so clearly unreasonable and arbitrary as to require them to be held
repugnant to- the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
More recently, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,104 "a statute born
of the exigencies of war,"' 51 was held consistent with the due process clause.1 6
The cases considering the question of whether a person ,has been deprived
of his physical liberty without due process are very few, and have chiefly
involved state statutes. In Jacobson v. Massaclusetts,07 the Supreme Court
upheld a state statute providing for compulsory vaccination when the Board
of Health found it necessary for the public health or safety. Confirming the
supremacy of the public welfare over individual rights, the Court said :108
"But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in
each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good."
102279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1929).
10 3Id. at 262, 49 Sup. Ct. at 317 (1929).
'
0 4Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942).
05Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U. S. 4,
17, 62 Sup. Ct. 875, 883 (1942).
'
0 0Henderson v. Kimmel, 47 F. Supp. 635 (D. Kan. 1942). See Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135,
41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Company v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170,
41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921) ; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289 (1922).
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923), the Supreme Court, holding
unconstitutional a peacetime statute which established a penalty for teaching in school
any modern language other than English to any child who had not passed the eighth
grade, said at 402, 628:
"Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every charac-
teristic of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration.
But the means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the
State and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain
enough and ito adequate reason therefor i time of peace and domestic tranquillity
has been shown." (Italics supplied).
107197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358 (1905).
10 81d. at 26, 25 Sup. Ct. at 361 (1905).
19431
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Particularizing the rule, the Court said :109
"Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a com-
munity has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which
threatens the safety of its members."
As a further example of a reasonable interference with personal liberty, the
Court pointed out that an American citizen, arriving at an American port on
a vessel in which, during the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever,
although apparently free from disease himself, may in some circumstances be
held in quarantine against his will. The Court again recognized the necessity
for subordinating private rights to insure the public safety when it said :A10
"There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert
the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any
human government, especially of any free government existing under a
written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is
equally true that in. every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect
of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulatiis. as
the safety of the general public may demand." (Italics supplied.)
Other restrictions upon personal liberty have been held consistent with due
process: legislation providing for the commitment of persons proven to be
of a "psychopathic personality,""' providing for the sex sterilization 'of cer-
tain types of mental defectives," u2 permitting the exclusion of healthy persons
from a locality infected with a contagious disease, l 3 and excluding unvacci-
nated children from schools."x4 In Moyer v. Peabody,115 the Supreme Court
held that during an insurrection, the temporary detention of the leader of the
outbreak at the order of the governor did not deprive him of his liberty with-
out due process of law. In the Selective Draft Law Cases,116 the first selective
draft act was held constitutional against the contention that forced military
service was "in conflict with all the great guarantees of the Constitution as
to individual liberty.' ' 1
7
10 91d, at 27, 25 Sup. Ct. at 362 (1905).
11Old. at 29, 25 Sup. Ct. at 362 (1905).
-
11 Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 60 Sup. Ct. 523 (1940).
"12Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1927). See Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U. S. 535, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110 (1942).
113Compagnie Frangaise v. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380, 22 Sup. Ct. 811 (1902).114Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 Sup. Ct. 24 (1922).
15212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235 (1909).
"16245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1918).
1 7See also, Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Local Board No. 1
v. Connors, 124 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941).
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There can be little doubt that the exclusion and curfew regulations con-
stitute reasonable wartime measures necessary for the protection of the
national safety. When a nation is engaged in war, the military are the proper
persons to determine which areas are vulnerable, which contain vital produc-
tive facilities, and which may become theaters of operations. Espionage and
sabotage present a distinct threat to strategic zones, and potentially dangerous
persons must be rendered harmless.
The cry of the American-born Japanese, "We are citizens!" constitutes a
powerful but unconvincing argument against the reasonableness of curfew
and exclusion. The argument amounts to a contention that citizenship creates
a presumption of loyalty. Differences of race, religion, customs, and language
have, however, prevented the Japanese from being assimilated within the
general population."1 7' Being thus segregated, the American-born Japanese
become more susceptible to the influence of their alien enemy parents, whose
ties to their native land, in many cases, are very powerful. The possibility,
therefore, that persons of Japanese ancestry, although born in this country,
will sympathize with and aid Japan becomes extremely great. 8 Because we
do not speak their language, and because they are congregated together in
large numbers, detection of traitorous individuals is virtually impossible. It
would be unreasonable, moreover, to expect the military-to wait for a deter-
mination of individual loyalty before taking precautionary measures. The
danger from the enemy demands speed in insuring safety; their treachery
emphasizes the need for immediate action. To establish a curfew for, and to
exclude, all the Japanese119 hastily and to inquire into individual cases at
leisure is by no means an unreasonable policy in time of war.
117'While it is true that state laws such as those prohibiting ownership of land by
the Japanese have not contributed toward their assimilation, the wisdom of such legislation
is not relevant to the present issue.
118 The Ninth Circuit Court recently referred to the Hawaiian Islands as including in
their population a large element "presumptively alien in sympathy." See Ex parte
Zimmerman, 132 F. (2d) 442, 446 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942), cert. den. 11 U. S. L. WEEK 3332
(U. S. 1942).
"
0 The Government has conceded that the vast majority of the Japanese population in
America are loyal to the United States. See Brief for the United States, Yasui v. United
States, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 9th, 1943). Nevertheless, because of the difficulties in
discovering the disloyal persons, it is proper to impose necessary restrictions upon the
entire group. Cf. Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, 604 (1878) where the Supreme Court
said:
"The district of country declared by the constituted authorities during the late civil
war, to be" in insurrection against the government of the United States, was enemy
territory, and all the people residing within such district were, according to public
law, and for all purposes connected with the prosecution of the war, liable to be
treated by the United States, pending the war, and while they remained within the
lines of the insurrection, as enemies, without reference to their personal Sentiments
and dispositions." (Italics supplied).
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Detention presents a somewhat more difficult but not impossible type of
restriction to justify. Granting that no presumption of loyalty to this country
is attached to citizenship where the Japanese are concerned, the unrestricted
privilege of going anywhere in the United States (except, of course, into the
prohibited zones) would enable the disloyal individuals to commit acts inimical
to the succdssful prosecution of the war.19'9 The necessity for protective
custody of the Japanese, moreover, may be an additional justification for their
detention. Feeling against the Japanese has run very high in all parts of the
United States as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor,'12 0 and protection
of the Japanese in the United States against physical violence is certainly to
be desired, both from a humanitarian view and because of the possibility of
reprisals by the enemy.
The doctrine of protective custody does not appear to have been the subject
of litigation or prior legislation in this country. It has not been uncommon
for police officers to offer protection to persons threatened with bodily in-
jury.120  In Germany the authorities have found protective custody a useful
label for the illegal arrest, of important public officials.
The case of Puchanan v. Warley'2' does not present an obstacle to the
adoption of the theory of protective custody as justification for detention.
The case involved a city ordinance which prohibited white or colored persons
from occupying a house in any block where a greater number of houses were
occupied by persons of the other race. One of the purposes of the ordinance
was the promotion of the public peace by providing for racial segregation.
In holding that the ordinance imposed upon property owners an unreasonable
restriction on their right to dispose of their houses in violation of the due
process clause, the Supreme Court stated that although the preservation of
the public peace is highly desirable, it could not be accomplished by laws
which denied rights protected by the Constitution. Even conceding that
detention constitutes a more serious invasion of personal liberty than does a
restriction upon freedom of property disposition, the case is distinguishable.
1l 9'Professor Fairman questions the value of individual hearings as a satisfactory
solution because of the difficulty of establishing a proper standard of loyalty, because" of
our lack of understanding of the Japanese, and because of the long time which would be
required to make a thorough investigation in even a small fraction of the cases. He
suggests that in view of the irreparable consequences which might result from unre-
stricted freedom to disloyal Japanese, the inconvenience to the loyal Japanese caused by
the evacuation program "seems only one of the unavoidable hardships incident to the war."
Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 55 HARV. L.
Rav. 1253, 1301-1302.
22OHearings before the Select Committee Investigatidg National Defense Migration
Pursuant to H. Res. 113, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 11015-11016.
120"See, for example, The Evening Star, Washington, D. C., June 12, 1943, p. A-3.
121245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16 (1917).
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For one thing, the restriction upon occupancy was permanent, whereas the
detention of the Japanese is a temporary wartime measure. Moreover, the
consequences of racial clashes during peacetime between colored and white
persons would not be as far reaching as those which would flow from attacks
upon the Japanese. The former would result in bodily harm in isolated in-
stances, and in most cases would be adequately handled by peace officers.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, antagonism towards the Japanese,
alien and citizen, has achieved great proportions in the United States The
governor of every western state but one actively protested against the settle-
ment of the Japanese within his state.'22 It is too much to expect that persons
of alien ancestry who are forced to leave their homes, their jobs, and their
businesses, who are refused admission to other states, who are unable to find
adequate shelter and a means of livelihood, and who are subjected to physical
violence should remain loyal to the United States. It therefore becomes
extremely important that the Japanese be protected from such difficulties.
Accordingly, their detention in war relocation centers appears to be a reason-
able method of insuring the safety of the nation.
1224
B. Equal Protection
Exclusion, curfew, and detention, as noted above, have been imposed, apart
from enemy aliens; only upon citizens of Japanese ancestry. Superficially,
this might appear to be a highly invalid example of race prejudice at odds
with our constitutional notions of equal treatment. 2 3 A closer analysis, how-
ever, will reveal that ample justification for the classification exists, and that
the regulations do not violate the Fifth Amendment.
There appears to be some question as to whether, and to what extent, the
equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. As fre-
quently pointed out, the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause.1 24 Yet the contention that a federal statute or regulation is discrim-
12 2Fourth Interim Report of Tolan Committee, H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942) 203; Preliminary Report of Tolan Committee, H. R. REF. No. 1911, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 27 et seq.
122"With the termination of the emergency detention would no longer be reasonable.
See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 547, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 406 (1924). The
writer ventures to suggest, however, that serious danger of sabotage and espionage re-
quiring, the detention of the Japanese will not cease earlier than the time of cessation of
hostilities between Japan and the United States.
123This was the opinion of the Federal District Court in United States v. Yasui, 48 F.
Supp. 40, 53 (D. Ore. 1942).
124Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180
(1917) ; Labelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377, 41 Sup. Ct. 528 (1920) ;
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921) , Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937) ; United'States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U. S. 144, 58 Sup. Ct. 788 (1938) ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379
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inatory has never been rejected by the Supreme Court solely on the ground
that the Constitution does not prohibit discriminatory federal action.125 The
Supreme Court has said that there is no requirement of uniformity in the
exercise of a power granted in the Constitution, where the grant of the power
contains no such express requirement 2 6 The discrimination must be of such
injurious character as to bring into operation the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.1 27 Invariably, the decisions have sustained or invalidated
legislation on the ground- that the classification established by the statute is
or is not founded upon a reasonable basis. Thus, discrimination is not, per se,
unconstitutional. The requirements of equal protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment, however, subject the Federal Government "to restraints less narrow
and confining" than those imposed upon the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and consequently any statute which does not deny the equal protection
of the laws required by the Fourteenth Amendment would not, a fortiari,
violate the Fifth Amendment. 28  It is important to note that even the Four-
teenth Amendment permits latitude in classification, and does not confine the
states to a formula of rigid uniformity.129 "The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment," said the Supreme Court in Lindsley v. National
Carbonic Gas Co.,' 30 "does not take from the state the power to classify in the
(1939) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60 Sup. Ct. 907 (1940);
Liberty Paper Board Co., Inc. v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 751 (D. Ohio, 1941)
Florida Fruit & Produce, Inc. v. United States, 117 F. (2d) 506 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941);
Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, 126 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
125 See dissenting opinion in Colgate v. Harvey, 296.U. S. 404, 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 264
(1935). But cf. United States v. Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657, 661 (W. D. Wash. 1942).
'
26 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379 (1939) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal
Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60 Sup. Ct. 907 (1940) ; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western,
Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180 (1917). In Currin v. Wallace, the
Supreme Court, in discussing the commerce power, stated at 13-14, 386:
"We have repeatedly said that the power given to Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitation, other than are prescribed. To hold that Congress in
establishing its regulation is restricted to the making of uniform rules would be to
impose a limitation which the constitution does not prescribe. There is no require-
ment of uniformity in connection with the commerce power (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3,
Const. U. S. C. A.) such as there is with respect to the power to lay duties, imposts,
and excises."
Cf. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 574 (1931) in which
the Court stated: "From its very nature the war power, when necessity arises for its exer-
cise, tolerates no qualifications or limitations, unless found in the Constitution ......
Accord, North Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502 (1918).
127Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379 (1939) ; Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 47 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937) ; Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S.
329, 63 Sup. Ct. 297 (1943).
'
2
sCurrin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379 (1939).
12 9Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337 (1911).
130220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337 (1911).
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adoption of police law, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and voids what is done only when it is without any reasonable.
basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary." Furthermore, the validity of a
classification depends upon the facts of each individual case.131
It is well settled, of course, that a classification based on nothing more than
race prejudice is unreasonable ;132 but "it does not follow that alien race and
allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate
object of legislation as to be made the basis of a permitted classification."'1 33
The situation surrounding American citizens of Japanese ancestry is far
different from that of citizens whose ancestors lived in the other alien enemy
countries. As already pointed out, the Japanese have always encountered the
problem of racial segregation. Large numbers are concentrated on the west
coast. Across the Pacific lies Japan. The combination of these facts makes it
entirely reasonable for the military to believe that there is greater danger
from the possibility of enemy allegiance among the Japanese than among
others. "The legislature," the Supreme Court has said, "is free to recognize
degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases
where the need is deemed to be clearest. ... If the law presumably hits the
evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances in which it might have been applied."' 34 The validity of confining
exclusion, curfew, and detention to citizens of Japanese ancestry, however,
does not necessarily depend upon the fact that a greater degree of danger may
be anticipated from this class. Neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Four-
teenth Amendment compels the prohibition of all like evils.' 35 "The Legisla-
ture may hit at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike
at another."''z1
Little more need be said with reference to the application of these regu-
lations to all the Japanese, regardless of individual loyalty. The Supreme
Court has regarded as settled the principle that "when it is necessary in order
to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to
be prevented it may do so.'
131Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 22 Sup. Ct. 431 (1902).
'
32Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886); Nixon v. Condon,
286 U. S. 73, 52 Sup. Ct. 484 (1932) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915).
133Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 396, 47 Sup. Ct. 630, 631 (1927) ; see also
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 48 Sup. Ct. 91 (1927) ; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138 (1896).
134Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 384, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 344-345 (1915). See Patsone
v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 282 (1914).
135United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 151, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 783
(1938) ; Florida Fruit and Produce, Inc. v. United States, 117 F. (2d) 506, 508 (C. C. A.
5th, 1941).
136Ibid.
'
37Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 259, 47 Sup. Ct. 629, 630 (1927). In
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Executive Order No. 9066 contains the following provision:
"I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the
said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appro-
priate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance
with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove author-
ized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other
Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local
agencies." (Italics supplied.)
It was soon recognized' 3s that the use of troops as a means of enforcement of
exclusion, curfew, and detention orders was unsatisfactory. 3 9 Accordingly,
the Secretary of War addressed letters to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives 40 and to Senator Reynolds, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs
Committee 4' enclosing a draft of a proposed bill'4 "to provide a penalty for
violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining
in, or leaving military areas or zones," and recommending its enactment into
law. On March 21, 1942, the bill, with one change, was approved by the
President.143
Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1927), the Supreme Court, sustaining
against a claim of discrimination a municipal ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens
of licenses to operate pool rooms, said that it was competent for the city to exclude
"from the conduct of a dubious business an entire class rather than its objectionable
members selected by more empirical methods." See also Ford v. Surget, note 119 supra.
13During the debates on S. 2352, now Pub. L. No. 503, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., March
21, 1942, Senator Reynolds stated: "To quote the words of Colonel Bryan, of the War
Department, who appeared before our committee:
"'The purpose of this bill is to provide for enforcement in the Federal courts of
orders issued under the authority of this proclamation. As things now stand orders
can be issued but there is no penalty provided for violation of orders and restrictions
so issued. Last evening General DeWitt called me on the telephone from the west
coast, talked to me personally, and he stated that the passage of this bill was neces-
sary to enable him to properly carry out the provisions of the Executive order.'"
88 CONG. Rac. 2724 (1942).
13 9Enforcement through the injunctive process [see In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup.
Ct. 900 (1895)] is equally unsatisfactory because it is slow and cumbersome.
340H. R. REP. No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 2.
14188 CONG. REc. 2725 (1942).
142S. 2352 and H. R. 6758, identical bills, were introduced in the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively.
'
43 Pub. L. No. 503, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1942) provides as follows:
S. . .whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military
area or military zone prescribed under the authority of an Executive order of the
President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by
the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or
zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military com-
mander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and
extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed
$5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense."
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It thus becomes important to determine the effect of this statute upon
Executive Order No. 9066 and the regulations issued thereunder, and to
examine its constitutionality.
A. Effect of Public Law No. 503
It is necessary to draw a distinction between the effect of the statute upon
orders and regulations issued prior to its enactment and upon those issued
subsequently. The distinction is the difference between ratification and dele-
gation, and must be made because it is questionable whether punishment for
the violation of a regulation committed prior to the enactment of Public Law
No. 503 would have been consistent with the constitutional provision prohibit-
ing ex post facto legislation.
The entire legislative history of Public Law No. 503 indicates a Congres-
sional intention to ratify the action theretofore taken by the President, the
Secretary of War, and General DeWitt. Not only did the Secretary of War,
in his letters to Congress, state that the purpose of the proposed legislation
was to provide for the enforcement in the federal criminal courts of regula-
tions issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066,144 but Senator Reynolds,
who sponsored the Senate bill, read to the Senate a considerable portion of
Public Proclamation No. 1.145 The power of Congress to ratify executive
action is, of course, settled.146 It would, therefore, seem unnecessary to re-issue
either the executive order or the regulations issued pursuant to its authority.1 47
The large majority of regulations were issued subsequent to the enactment
of Public Law No. 503. While it is true that the language of that statute
merely provides a penalty for the violation of such regulations, a further
examination of its legislative history discloses an intention to confer broad
powers on the military authorities. 48 Thus, Senator Reynolds explained the
purpose of the bill as follows :149
"It is my understanding that in order to carry out the objectives of
the Proclamation, and thus keep clear the military areas which have been
defined by General DeWitt, the Commander of the western area, we are
asked to provide the department with authority to keep certain indi-
144See notes 140 and 141 supra.
.4588 CONG. REc. 2724 (1942).
146Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. S. 354, 61 Sup. Ct. 979 (1941); Isbrandtsen-Moller Co.
v. United States, 300 U. S. 139, 147, 57 Sup. Ct. 407, 411 (1937).
147Cf. § 206 of the Emergency Price Control Act, Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942).
'4SAt 88 CONG. Rwc. 2724 (1942), Senator Reynolds stated: "The War Department has
asked me to sponsor this bill which will confer broad powers on the military authorities
charged with the protection of certain zones in our country."
14988 CONG. REc. 2725 (1942).
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viduals from entering or leaving military areas, from not complying with
any of the curfew laws, or any regulations which might be established
within those zones."
Public Law No. 503 may thus be reasonably construed to contain a delegation
of authority.
B. Constitutionality of Public Law No. 503
The constitutionality of Public Law No. 503 involves these questions: Does
the power sought to be exercised exceed the authority of Congress ?150 Does
the statute contain a proper delegation of legislative authority?151
1. War Power of Congress.-
It has long been recognized that the war power of Congress includes the
authority to take all measures reasonably appropriate to the effective mobil-
ization of the entire resources of the nation, human and material, for the
successful waging of war. 52 Among the measures which the Supreme Court
has sustained as appropriate exercises of the war power, have been the taking
over and operation of the railroads, 153 telephone and telegraph lines,'"4
selective service legislation,155 the regulation of fuel prices,156 ,and the pro-
hibition of the sale or manufacture of beverages of more than one-half per
cent alcoholic content.15 7 There can be little doubt that the establishment of
criminal penalties for violation of regulations relating to evacuation, curfew,
and detention in military areas constitutes a proper exercise of the congres-
sional war power.
2. Delegation.-
It is well settled that the Constitution does not completely forbid delegation
of legislative power, but prohibits only excessive delegation. Prior to the
15OThe discussion of the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the presidential
war powers, supra, is equally applicable here.
151 Inasmuch as the regulations describe the prohibited acts with particularity, the
statute does not violate the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments that ade-
quate standards of criminal conduct must be established. Kay v. United States, 303
U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 468 (1938) ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct.
380 (1910). The latter case also held that the establishment of criminal penalties for
violation of administrative regulations does not constitute a delegation of the power to
create crimes.
152Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870).
153Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502 (1919);
Dupont de Nemours Co. v. Davies, 264 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 364 (1924).
154Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. So. Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507 (1919).
'
55Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1918).
'5 6Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1929).
¢57Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (1920).
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decisions in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 58 and Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
U.L ited States,6 0 the Supreme Court had never declared a statute unconsti-
tutional on the ground that it contained an invalid delegation of legislative
authority. The decision in the Schechter case was that Congress had estab-
lished insufficient statutory standards to guide the President with respect to
the type of regulations he might issue. The Panawm case enunciated the
principle that legislative standards are insufficient if they do not indicate under
what circumstances the delegee may act. Since these cases, the pendulum has
swung the other way, and the recent delegations have been consistently
upheld. 60 Accordingly, if Public Law No. 503 is not open to the same
objections as the statutes involved in the Schechter and Panama Refining
cases, it should be sustained.
Public Law No. 503 in effect empowers the Secretary of War or any mili-
tary commander designated by him to issue regulations with respect to the
right of any person to enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in, any
military area or zone prescribed by them under the authority of an executive
order of the President. The respective reports of the Senate and House
Military Affairs Committee reveal that Executive Order No. 9066 is the one
which Congress had in mind. 16 1 That order recited the need for every possible
protection against espionage and sabotage to "national-defense material,
national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities," as defined in Title
50, Section 104, of the United States Code. This need is reiterated in the
House committee report.162 Thus, although the statute itself sets forth no
legislative policy, it would seem to be a fair argument that Congress, aware
that the purpose of the statute was to permit enforcement of regulations issued
pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066, adopted the aims which guided the
President in issuing his order. In addition, the House committee report
describes the safety of the evacuees as a further purpose of the statute :163
"The passage of this legislation will not only provide for the protection
of the military areas or zones, but also be a means for preserving the
safety and security of the persons who are to be removed."
158293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
150295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
16OCurrin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379 (1939); United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993 (1939) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60 Sup. Ct. 907 (1940) ; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312
U. S. 126, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (1941).
161SEN. REP. No. 1171, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 2; H. R. REP. No. 1906, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 1.
162H. R. REP. No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). 2.
C3 Ibid.
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There appears to be, therefore, no lack of a legislative policy in connection
with the statute.
The delegation of authority to prohibit the entry into, departure from, or
remaining within a military zone is an unambiguous standard. Some question
may arise with respect to delegation of authority to prohibit "any act." The
legislative history of Public Act No. 503, however, indicates that Congress
was concerned with the prohibition of curfew violations. 6 4 Moreover, the
rule of ejusdem generis may well be applied to limit the delegation of power
to prohibit acts similar in nature to the more specific grant of power. 16
The validity of delegation of authority to establish military areas and zones
is similarly open to question because of the absence of guiding standards.
Resort on ce more to the purposes and legislative history of Public Act No. 503
is appropriate. The House committee report contains this illuminating state-
ment with reference to the need for protection against espionage and
sabotage :166
"In order to provide such protection it has been deemed advisable to
remove certain aliens as well as citizens from areas in which war pro-
duction is located and where ndlitary activities are being conducted."
(Italics supplied.)
By congressional definition, then, a military area is a center of war produc-
tion 67 or of military activities, and such definition appears to be an adequate
indication of the areas in which evacuation and curfew regulations might be
issued. But what of the war relocation centers in which the Japanese have
been detained? True, these have been designated as military areas, 68 but
it is difficult to square such designations with the definition of military areas
as war production or military activities centers. It is well to remember, how-
ever, that Public Act No. 503 was in part intended as a means for preserving
the safety of the evacuees, and it may be reasonably inferred that in using the
term "military area" Congress was aware that the detention of the Japanese
1 6 41bid. SEN. REP. No. 1171, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 2; 88 CoNG. RFc. 2725
(1942).
165Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 9, 58 Sup. Ct. 468 472-473 (1938).166H. R. REP. No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 2. See also Public Proclamation
No. 1, March 2, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2320 (1942) which, before the enactment of Pub. L.
No. 503, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1942) had established as military areas and
zones certain territory which "by its geographical location is particularly subject to
attack, to attempted invasion by the armed forces of nations with which the United States
is now at war, and, in connection therewith, is subject to espionage and acts of sabotage,
thereby requiring the adoption of military measures necessary to establish safeguards
against such enemy operations."
167 1t is doubtful that the Congressional conception of a military area requires the
coincidence of war production and military activities in the same place.
168See note 23, supra.
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in zones of war production or military activities would defeat the entire pur-
pose of the legislation. Accordingly, it is not an unfair construction of the
congressional intent to say that a military area should likewise include any
area in which, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or his designated
commanders, the purposes of the statute would be best effectuated. 69 Par-
ticularly in legislation involving protection of the national security against its
enemies, "it is no argument against constitutionality of an act to say that it
delegates broad powers to executives to determine the- details of any legis-
lative scheme.'
170
V. CONCLUSION
Without doubt, the restrictions imposed upon the American-born Japanese
are not pleasant. It is no light matter to be uprooted from one's home, and
sent to unfamiliar surroundings, faced with the necessity of adjustment to a
new mode of living. Nevertheless, the problem presented bythe presence of
the Japanese in this country should not be met with less harsh methods at
the expense of effectiveness. We cannot afford-to borrow the words of the
President in his recent appeal to the striking coal miners-to "gamble with
the lives of American soldiers and sailors and the future security of all our
whole people. It would involve an unwarranted, unnecessary and terribly
dangerous gamble with our chances for victory." Given the necessity for
action, legal justification is not lacking.
169See Ex parte Lincoln Seiichi Kanai, 46 F. Supp. 286, 288 (E. D. Wis. 1942).
17oUnited States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U. S. 533, 574, 59 Sup. Ct. 993, 1013
(1939). An interesting possibility is that even if the delegation in Pub. L. No. 503,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1942) would otherwise be invalid, it might be sustained
on the ground that since the President derives authority to establish the regulations from
the Constitution as well as the statute, broader standards may accompany the statutory
delegation. See, for example, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57
Sup. Ct. 216 (1936), in which the Supreme Court upheld a delegation of power to the
President to place an embargo on the sale of arms to certain countries engaged in war
if he found that he would thus contribute to the re-establishment of peace between them.
The Court pointed out that it was dealing with authority granted by Congress plus the
constitutional power of the President in the field of international relations--"a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." The decision
seems, however, to be limited to the delegation of powers of "external sovereignty," that
is, "the powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties ......
Although the Supreme Court will probably sustain the delegation in Pub. L. No. 503,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1942), a more detailed statute should have been enacted
so that a favorable decision could be reached without resort to legal gymnastics.
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GENESIS, EXODUS, AND LEVITICUS
GENEALOGY, EVACUATION, AND LAW'
HARROP A. FREEMAN
Neither interest in family trees, nor childhood reading of the innumerable
"begats" in Genesis, nor the famous words of justice Holmes, "Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough," 2 accounts for the present attention to genealogy.
Strange as it may seem, it is the association of the same three ideas identified
with the first three books of the Bible-Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law-
which brings us back to inquire into the bearing of ancestry upon a person's
rights and the protection which he shall be afforded in society.
The presence of Jewish blood in one's veins, traced not merely to the third
and fourth but to the nth generation has been the occasion in Germany for
"days of broken glass," pogroms, mass evacuations, and slaughter. Many
dismiss the insistent question, "Can these things be under law" by denying
that Germany operates under a system of law. But the question cannot thus
be downed.
On January 2, 1942, the President of the United States issued a statement:
"Remember the Nazi technique: 'Pit race against race, religion against religion,
prejudice against prejudice. Divide and conquer.' We must not let that happen
'If any who read this article look upon persons of Japanese ancestry with suspicion
and hatred and accept the phrase, "A Jap's a Jap," then, if they would protect the basic
liberties by which they themselves live, they must be the more cautious to see that these
rights and liberties are protected to those whom they deem most objectionable. This has
been well expressed by Macauley in his simile on liberty: "Liberty resembles the Fairy
of Ariasto who, by some mysterious law of her nature, was condemned to appear at
certain seasons in the form of a foul and poisonous snake. Those who injured her during
the period of her disguise, were forever excluded from participation in the blessings which
she bestowed. But to those who, in spite of her loathsome aspect, pitied and protected
her, she afterwards revealed herself in the beautiful and celestial form which was natural
to her, accompanied their steps, granted all, their wishes, filled their houses with wealth,
made them happy in love. . . . Such is the spirit of Liberty. At times she takes the,
form of a hateful reptile. She grovels, she hisses, she stings. But woe to those who in
disgust shall venture to crush her! And happy are those who, having dared to receive
her in her degraded and frightful shape, shall at length be rewarded by her in the time
of her beauty and her glory."
As Judge Pound of New York said, "Although the defendant may be the worst of men,
the rights of the best of men are secure only as the rights of the vilest and most abhorrent
are protected." Quoted by Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., The Bill of Rights Belongs to the
People (1942) 2 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 92, 93.
The review by the United States Supreme Court of the saboteur trials is typical of
the tenacity with which our legal system holds to this position. Ex parte Quirn, 317
U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942). See Cushman, Ex parte Quirn et al.-The Nazi Saboteur
Case (1942) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 54.2 Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1927).
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here."3 Yet within ninety days after those words were spoken we had evacu-
ated 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, of whom 79,000 were American
citizens, from five states on the. west coast.
On May 10, 1942, three cases involving the constitutionality of this evacua-
tion were argued before the United States Supreme Court.4 These cases pre-
sent the crucial issue of this war on the "home front."
It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will squarely face the constitution-
ality of the action taken.5
I. THE STATUTES, ORDERS, AND PROCLAMATIONS
By the Act of July 6, 1798, authority was given the President to control
"all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects" of the enemy within the United
States.6 This was one of a series of acts known as the Alien and Sedition
Laws. To certain parts of these acts, particularly those permitting the appre-
hension of persons "suspected to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the
United States," and those interpreted as applying to alien friends as well as
alien enemies, the opposition was immediate and vocal, 7 and resulted in sub-
stantial non-enforcement of these objectionable provisions.
Hearings before Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration on Prob-
lemns of Evacuation of E emy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones Pursuant
ito H. R, Res. 113, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) [hereafter referred to as Tolan Committee
Hearings] 11,042; yet in government briefs we see this pitting of race against race,
religion against religion, prejudice against prejudice. Brief for Appellee, 12-32, Hira-
bayashi v. United States, - U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1943).4Hirabayashi v. United States; Korematsu v. United States; Yasui v. United States.
All three cases were certified to the Supreme Court from the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
GCompare Ex parte Vallandingham, 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1864), wherein certiorari was
denied during the war, with Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866). Should the
Supreme Court uphold the constitutionality of the evacuation program, I would not, as
many a more illustrious colleague has, assert that "the Constitution is gone." See collec-
tion of statements: Fairlie, Has the Constitution Gone? (1935) 33 MicHr. L. REv. 1037.
One might, however, see the fulfillment of the words of Chief Justice Hughes uttered in
1920: "We may well wonder in view of the precedents now established, whether consti-
tutional government as heretofore maintained in this republic could survive another great
war, even victoriously waged" and might raise the question, if this is a "survival war,"
as President Roosevelt has said, for what are we surviving but those very rights asserted
by the appellants in the three cases?
--- Since the preparation of this article, on June 21 the Supreme Court upheld the
convictions in these cases based upon violation of the curfew regulations but expressly
refused to decide the constitutionality of the evacuation program. Hirabayashi v. United
States, 318 U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1943) ; Yasui v. United States, 318 U. S. -, 63
Sup. Ct. 1392 (1943). The question may again be presented in a case involving only the.
evacuation.
040 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. § 21 (1940).
7Mr. Livingston, speaking in the Senate: 4 E.Lior's DFaTEs (1876) 440. The Vir-
ginia Resolution declaring the acts unconstitutional, passed December 24, 1798. Id. at
528. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1789 and 1799 were drafted largely by Jefferson.
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In 1812 when our eastern coast was ravaged by Britain, proclamations were
made prohibiting male British subjects over eighteen years of age from dwell-
ing within forty miles of the eastern tidewater. This was enforced by volun-
tary removal to places farther inland, and by compulsion by the United States
marshals upon refusal."
In 1917, in furtherance of the Act of 1798, proclamations were issued under
which alien enemies were controlled.9 In broad outline these may be said to
have liberalized the treatment of alien enemies, assured them that they would
not be molested in their ordinary pursuits so long as they obeyed the law and
acted loyally, and subjected them "to restraint, or to give security, or to re-
move and depart from the United States" if they failed so to act. The amend-
ments of the Act of 1798 on April 16, 1918,1 and in 1940 were slight, chiefly
to broaden the application to females."
It was under these laws that President Roosevelt made his proclamations
of December 7 and 8, 1941,12 restraining German, Italian, or Japanese aliens
from violating the laws of the United States, giving aid or information to its
enemies, or interfering in any way with its defense and making such aliens
"liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the
United States." Possession of various articles including firearms and cameras
Id. at 540. When these resolutions were circulated to the various states, those states
which argued for the constitutionality of the laws did so on the basis that aliens did not
have the rights of citizens, and conceded that the acts would be improper as applied to
citizens, e.g., the reply of Massachusetts. Id. at 534-535. This distinction was recog-
nized in Madison's report to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1800. Id. at 554. The
position taken by the states of Virginia and Kentucky resulted in a change of adminis-
tration; the Alien and Sedition Laws were very laxly enforced; and the whole issue of
detention of aliens or citizens disappeared from significance. In Case of Fries, 9 Fed.
Cas. 826, No. 5,126 (C. C. D. Pa. 1799) the act was upheld on the theory of detention
to prevent the commission of a crime. See 2 BEVERIDGE THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL
(1919) 381 ff.; BoWERs, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN
AMERIcA, (1937) 375-80.
8Such action was upheld in Lockington v. Smith, 15 Fed. Cas. 758, No. 8, 448 (C. C.
D. Pa. 1817) ; Lockingtoa's Case, 1 Brightly 269 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1813) and Brown v.
United States, 8 Cranch 110, 121 (U. S. 1814).
940 STAT. 1650, 1651 (1917) ; 40 STAT. 1716 (1917) ; 40 STA. 1729 (1917). Although
during the first World War indiscriminate and wholesale internment of aliens took place
in Great Britain, Germany, and France, the Attorney General in the United States was
governed by a determination of whether the particular alien was dangerous to the public
safety. REP. An''y GEN. (1918) 26.
1040 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. §§ 21-24 (1940).
11This act was upheld as to restraints upon and removal of alien enemies against the
argument of lack of due process in Mihwtto v. Bradley, 252 Fed. 600. (N. D. Ill. 1918) and
DeLacey v. United States, 249 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
12Proclamation No. 2525, December 7, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 6321 (1941) ; H. R. REP. No.
2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 294-97. Proclamation No. 2526, December 8, 1941,
6 FED. REG. 6323 (1941) ; H. R. REP. No. 2124, 297-298. Proclamation No. 2527, Decem-
ber 8, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 6324 (1941) ; H. R. RI'. No. 2124, 299-300. Each preamble
reads: "Whereas, section 21 of title 50 of the United States Code provides.as follows :"
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was forbidden; and travel, membership in organizations and similar activities
were restricted. Execution of the regulations was vested in the Attorney
General as to continental United States, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico,
and in the Secretary of War as to the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands, the
Canal Zone, and after December 29, Alaska.13 The Attorney General and
Department of Justice immediately began to apprehend and detain alien
enemies who were considered dangerous.' 4 By Presidential Proclamation
No. 2537, issued January 14, 1942,15 all alien enemies were required to obtain
identification certificates from the Attorney General under such regulations as
he should deem necessary. The Attorney General issued orders and regula-
tions clarifying and carrying out the presidential proclamations; through all
13Alaska was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Attorney General and transferred
to the Secretary of War by Proclamation No. 2533, 7 FED. REG. 55 (1942) ; H. R. REP'.
No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 300.
14Attorney General Biddle stated his policy: "All alien enemies could be incarcerated.
. But it was determined to be more in accordance with our Apnerican tradition, wiser,
more humane, to hold only those who were dangerous to our safety, or who might become
so." Collier's Magazine, March 21, 1942, also statement in H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 28. This was. in accordance with our tradition of 125 years, [see
Koessler, Enwmy Alien Internment, (1942) 57 POL. Sci. Q. 98] in recognition of the fact
that "wholesale internment, without hearing and irrespective of the merits of individual
cases, is the long and costly way round, as the British discovered by painful experience,"
and in the light of the justification of the policy of interning only dangerous aliens during
the last war. REP. ATr'y GEN. (1918) 27; Statement of Attorney General Biddle, H. R.
REP. No. 2124, 27. Almost immediately after the outbreak of war, 5,000 aliens were
interned. ANNUAL REP. F. B. I. (1941) ; New Republic, March 16, 1942, 355. By April
15, 1942, 8,010 aliens had been arrested. N. Y. Times, April 16, 1942, p. 7, col. 3. By
June 30, 1942, 9,405 had been apprehended. ANNUAL REP. F. B. I. (1942) 6. By June,
1942, the F. B. I. had investigated 10,100 cases of reported sabotage, obtained 218 con-
victions and found not a "single foreign directed act of sabotage, except the sabotaging
of Italian ships by their crews." Id. at 5. Hearing boards were established in all federal
judicial districts [see (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2456] which by May, 1942, had released
one-half of the 2,500 interned aliens who had appeared before them. Interpreter Release
No. 198. Large amounts of contraband were seized from enemy aliens including "3,008
guns, 209,767 rounds of ammunition, 2,016 short wave radio receiving sets and 13 short
wave radio transmitting sets, 522 other signalling devices" together with cameras, photo-
graphs, maps, and confidential information. ANNUAL R-P. F. B. I. (1942) 6. Action
was also taken by the Attorney General to reach naturalized former Axis nationals be-
lieved to be dangerous. N. Y. Times, March 26, 1942, p. 25, col. 2; N. Y. Times, July 8,
1942, p. 1, col. 3; (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2456. The F. B. I. during the year June 1941
to June 1942 smashed two major spy rings and held in custody awaiting trial memnbers
of other rings; it convicted 56 persons of espionage; and its efficiency in apprehending
seven of the Nazi saboteurs landed on our shores in June, 1942, is one of the high points in
the history of crime detection. ANNUAL REP. F. B. I. (1942) 5. There has never, to my
knowledge, been any serious suggestion that the efforts of the Attorney General have been
inadequate in controlling subversive activities of enemy aliens of whom there are upwards
of one and one-half million, or American citizens of enemy stock of whom there are at
least eleven million. In fact we may conclude that the Attorney General is more thorough
than is General DeWitt for the General, in June, 1942, permitted German and Italian
aliens to return to vital defense areas on the west coast from which the Attorney General
removed them. N. Y. Times, June 29, 1942, p. 4, col. 1.
157 FED. REG. 329 (1942) ; H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 301.
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of which runs the test of "source of danger."' 0 Beginning with January 29,
1942, Attorney General Biddle designated limited areas on the west coast from
which all alien enemies were to be excluded,' 7 and on February 4 proclaimed
the entire coastline of California from the Oregon-border to Los Angeles and
from 30 to 150 miles inland a "restricted area" from which aliens were not
excluded but in which curfew was maintained and other restrictions were
imposed as to all aliens.1 These regulations necessitated the removal of
approximately 10,000 German, Italian, and Japanese aliens and their re-
establishment in jobs inland; not in concentration or relocation camps. 19
On February 19, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066
transferring the prescription of military areas "'from which any or all persons
may be excluded" from the Department of Justice to the Secretary of War and
military commanders whom he might designates2° On the same day, a bill,
S. 2293, was introduced in the Senate to authorize "the taking into custody
... of any or all Japanese"; this bill failed of passage.21 The Department of
Justice gave itsopinion that American citizens of Japanese ancestry could not
be removed under the President's executive orders.2 2 The reason for trans-
ferring this control was stated to be that since the Attorney General was
merely promulgating regulations for the areas recommended by the army, the
division of authority and responsibility seemed undesirable and that "as a
legal matter" and for the "acceptance [by] .. . the people generally" it would
be better if regulation of citizens were "an exercise of the war power."2
16(1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2405; (1942) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2425; (1942) 10 U. S. L.
WEEK 2441; 7 FED. REG. 844 (1942) ; Interpreter Releases No. 60 et seq., summarized
in H. R. Rxz'. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 159-160.
'
7Two areas in San Francisco and Los Angeles on January 29th; sixty-nine areas
around mouths of rivers, lighthouses, power plants, manufacturing locations on January
31st; fifteen areas in California around bridges, harbors, military reservations on February
2nd; forty-two additional strategic areas on February 4th; eighteen prohibited areas in
Arizona on February 7th. H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 302-314.
'
81d. at 310-12. Both the prohibited and "restricted" areas were described and recom-
mended by the War Department and that department made no recommendation for other
areas.19This removal was conducted by the aliens themselves. Tolan Committee Hearings,
11024 if.
207 IFED. REo. 1407 (1942) ; H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 314.
This order does not recite the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 (as amended) as authorization,
but depends on the President's powers as Commander-in'Chief to prevent espionage and
sabotage.
2188 CONG. Rnc., February 19, 1942; Report of the Committee on. Immigration of the
Senate, S. REP. No. 1496, Calendar No. 1541 (1942).
22bid.
23H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 166. Edward J. Ennis, Director
of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice, testifying before the Senate
Committee on Immigration on March 23 and 24, 1942. In the Tolan Committee Hearings,
neither General DeWitt, the President, nor the Attorney General introduced any other
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Between March 2 and March 21 by Public Proclamations No. 1 and No. 2,
Lieutenant General DeWitt prescribed approximately the same military areas
as had previously been established by the Attorney General and gave notice
that "Such persons or classes of persons as the situation may require will by
subsequent proclamation be excluded. '24
The "instructions, rules, and regulations prescribed" by the Attorney Gen-
eral25 "with respect to such prohibited and restricted areas," were "adopted
and continued in full force and effect" and the responsibility of the F.B.I. to
investigate alleged acts of espionage and sabotage was "not altered."26 On
March 15, when General DeWitt announced the formation of the wartime
Civil Control Administration, he still referred only to "areas from which Axis
enemies are to be removed. '2 7
On March 21, at the request of the Secretary of War, Public Law No. 503
was adopted, which made any person guilty of a misdemeanor who knowingly
did any act in a military area or zone contrary to the order of the Secretary
of War or military commander. 28
In the request for the bill and in the House and Senate discussion, the
emphasis was at all times on the removal of certain individuals fram limited
areas.&2 And even as thus restricted serious question was raised as to the
constitutionality of the law.- 0
statement as to the reasons for transfer of authority. The West Coast Congressional
Delegation on February 13 had merely asked the President to determine the policy on
"loyalty" rather than "citizenship." H. R. REP. No. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 3.24H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 317-329.
2See notes 17, 18, 19 supra.
267 FED. REG. 2320 (1942) ; H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 317-320.
The N. Y. Times, March 4, 1942, p. 1, col. 3, reported General DeWitt as intending to
evacuate gradually from an area 100 miles wide along the coast "all Japanese." This
was coupled with a statement that he might require the complete evacuation of all enemy
aliens. The proclamations required that any alien, "or any persons of Japanese ancestry"
obtain and execute a cfiange of residence, notice, in addition to the travel permits re-
quired of all aliens by the Attorney General.27H. R. REP. No. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 10.
28Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 503, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., c. 191 (1942) ; 56 STAT.
173, 18 U. S. C. A. § 97a (Supp. 1Q42).
2988 CONG. REc., part 2, pp. 27722-27725 (1942) ; H. R. REP. No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942) 2-3. Representative Costello for the House Military Affairs Committee
said: " . . . to remove certain aliens as well as citizens from areas in which war pro-
ductiom is ldcated and where military activiies are being conducted/" Id. at 2. Senator
Reynolds, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee said: "we are asked to
-provide the department with authority to keep certain individuals from entering or
leaving military zones .... "3OSenator Robert Taft said: "Mr. President, I think this is probably 'the 'sloppiest'
criminal law I have ever read or seen anywhere .... I have no doubt that in peace time
-no maq could ever be convicted under it because the Court would find that it was so
indefinite and so uncertain that it could not be enforced under the Constitution." 88 ColG.
Rc., March 19, 1942, 2807; H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 169.
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It was only on March 24, 1942, after Public Law No. 503 bad been passed,
that the first discrimination between the German-Italian group and the Jap-
anese was effected by General DeWitt's Public Proclamations No. 3 and 4.
Proclamation No. 3 prescribed a curfew for "all alien Japanese, all alien Ger-
mans, all alien Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry" in Military Area
No. 1 and directed that "no person of Japanese ancestry shall have in his
possession or use" certain items including cameras and firearms. 31 Public
Proclamation No. 4 prohibited "all alien Japanese and persons of Japanese
ancestry" in Military Area No. 1 "from leaving that area for any pur-
p o se. .. . 32l
On March 24 the first exclusion order3 3 required all persons of Japanese
ancestry to evacuate Bainbridge Island by March 30; the instructions which
accompanied this order made it clear that persons could remove to areas of
their own choosing or accept the government's provisions for "temporary resi-
dence."3 4 On March 30, 1942, in announcing certain classes of aliens who
might acquire exemption from exclusion orders, the General for the first time
pointed out that evacuation was in prospect for practically all Japanese. 3 One
hundred and five exclusion orders were issued, beginning March 30, the first
ninety-nine covering specified limited sections of Military Area No. 1, and
Public Proclamation No. 7 covering all the remainder of that Area.36 The
instructions accompanying these orders did not permit persons to remove to
areas of their own choosing, although the movement was still referred to as
"temporary residence.1
3 7
A War Relocation Authority was established by the President by Executive
Order No. 910638 to arrange for the care and employment of the evacuees.
Although about 7,000 evacuees are now on leave from the W.R.A. camps to
work at various points,3 9 small numbers have been permanently reestablished
in inland homes, 4 and the War Relocation Authority has recently recognized
311d. at 330-331.
32Id. at 331. This was said to be necessary "to insure the orderly evacuation and
resettlement of Japanese voluntarily migrating from Military area No. 1." Id. at 165.
33Id. at 332-333.
341d. at 333-334.35Press Release, Wartime Civil Control Administration, March '30, 1942; H. R. REP.
No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 165. Application of the same exemption to Jap-
anese would have left few to evacuate.
36N. Y. Times, June 8, 1942. By a queer coincidence Exclusion Order No. 57, under
which Gordon Hirabayashi was required to move from Seattle, Washington, was issued
on May 10, 1942, exactly one year to the day before his case attacking the constitution-
ality of the order was argued before the United States Supreme Court.
37H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 344.
381d. at 315-317.39Pacific Citizen, May 20, 1943, p. 6, col. 4.
401d. at 1, col. 3.
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that the establishment of relocation centers was a mistake and the evacuees
should be freed,41 the great bulk of the evacuees still reside, surrounded by
barbed wire and armed guards, in concentration camps, euphemistically re-
ferred to as "relocation centers."
Although German and Italian aliens were, under the original orders of the
Attorney General, excluded from certain areas on the west coast, they have,
since June, 1942, been permitted to return to these areas.42
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
Two broad constitutional questions are presented, each of which involves
determination of matters of degree or reasonableness. First, was the evacua-
tion program under the conditions existing on the west coast in February to
May of 1942 a constitutional exercise of the general power of the government,
often referred to as the' "police power"? Second, if the evacuation program
was thus justified, was the method employed within constitutional authoriza-
tion ?4 This approach accepts the oft repeated statement that the Constitution
is an instrument drawn for government in war as well as in peace 44 and goes
forward to essay an interpretation in keeping with the underlying concepts
of the Constitution and our framework of government.
We, therefore, need to restate the elementary and basic premises of our
system of jurisprudence before we attempt to formulate the rules of law to
be applied or to examine the available facts to guide our determination of
"degree" or "reasonableness."
Dean Roscoe Pound, in a recent address, lists "five characteristics of our
Anglo-American law ...(1) ... supremacy of law ... (2) subordination
of the military to the civil power ... (3) ... emergencies do not suspend
the constitution, (4) . . .there are fundamental individual rights, guaranteed
and protected by the constitutions ... (5) ...the constitutions set up and
the courts maintain a separation of powers. ' 45 I may be pardoned for briefly
411d. at 1, col. 1-2.42N. Y. Times, June 29, 1942, p. 4, col. 1.43More attention will be given to the first question since the second has been fairly
exhaustively argued in the Supreme Court whereas the first seems to me ultimately
determinative.44United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622, 51 Sup. Ct. 570, 574 (1931) ; Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 326, 56 Sup. Ct. 466, 473 (1936) ;
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919) ; Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159( (1918); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 79, 85,
29 Sup. Ct. 235, 237 (1908); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 161,
40 Sup. Ct. 106, 110 (1919); and Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.
398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1933) ; see also Hughes, War Powers under the Constitution (1917)
42 A. B. A. REP. 232.45Pound, War and the Law (1943) 14 PA. BAR Ass'x Q. 110, 112-113.
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documenting some portions of this most felicitous expression particularly
pertinent to the consideration at hand. Any law student knows the expressions
of the first characteristic; we may select the concise statement of Justice Miller
in United States v. Lee.46
Of less familiarity, if we can judge from the attitude of the military, other
executives, and even law writers,47 is .the second characteristic-the subor-
dination of the military to the civil power. We need not go back to English
precedent, though persuasive authority may also there be found. Our Declara-
tion of Independence stated the eleventh charge against the King as justifica-
tion for overthrowing a "government ... destructive of these ends" for which
"governments are instituted among men" that "he has affected to render the
military independent of, and superior to the civil power." It was "Lord
Dunmore's proclamation declaring his intention to execute martial law in that
province" [Virginia] which caused the first representative government to be
created in this country.48 The change of wording in the proposed Constitution
from "make war" to "declare war" was expressly for the purpose of "clogging
rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace." 49 In the Constitutional
Convention on August 20, 1787, proposals to be incorporated in the draft
constitution were submitted to the Committee of Five; included was a provi-
sion: "The military shall always be subordinate to the civil power, and no
grants of money shall be made by the legislature for supporting military land
46106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240 (1882). "No man in this country is so high that he is
above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with-impunity. All
the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government,
-and every man, who by accepting office, participates in its functions, is only the more
strongly bound to submit to the supremacy, and to observe the liabilities which it imposes
upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." General Myron C. Cramer, Judge
Advocate General, recently vivified this concept when he said: "Democracy and totali-
tarianism are gripped in a mighty battle and totalitarianism must be destroyed. Consti-
tutional government must find within itself the powers necessary to its own preservation.
In this total war, the rule of law rather than the rule of men must be preserved. This
contrast in philosophy of government and in the rights of men is the world issue today.'"
Cramer, Trial of the Eight Saboteurs (1942) 17 WASH. L. REv. 247.47See Hatcher, Martial Law and Habeas Corpus (1940) 46 W. VA. L. Q. 187; Tolan
Committee Summary, H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 147; Edward J.
Ennis, id. at 166; Hughes, War Powers under the Constitution (1917) 42 A. B. A. Ru'.
232, 238; Brief for government, Hirabayashi v. United States, 47. See also statements:
Colonel Bendetsen, H. R. REP. No. 2124. 9; Tom C. Clark, representing General DeWitt,
Tolan Committee Hearing, 11158; PresTident Roosevelt in the preamble to his Executive
Order No. 9066- [H. R. REP. No. 2124, 314] and in his Labor Day address to Congress
[both of which are criticized by Edward S. Corwin in American Government int War-
Tine (1943) 37 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 18 ff.]. Similar expressions were frequent during
the Civil War. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCoLN (1926) 30.
481 ELLIOT'S DEBATES (1876) 52.
493 DOCUmENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA
(1894-1905) 553, 554; 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES (1876) 246.
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forces for more than one year at a time." 50 As the Constitution wended its way
through ratification in the states, either in debate or by proposed amendments,
the various states showed their insistence upon the supremacy of civil over
military power.51
Though extreme advocates of the war power have always asserted that the
Constitution is not operative in wartime5 2 the Supreme Court has so often
repeated the rule that war does not abolish constitutional protections and that
501 ELLIOT'S DEBATES (1876) 249. Apparently, from their report, the committee
deemed the first portion sufficiently covered by the proposed constitution and inserted
the second part in Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONsTITUTION (1928) 504-505.51Rhode Island in its ratification declared: "at all times the military should be under
strict subordination to the civil power." 1 WARREN, op. cit. siupra note 50, at 336. New
York did "declare and make known" its interpretation of the Constitution and necessary
amendments to be adopted by its ratification: "At all times the military should be under
strict subordination to the civil power." Id. at vol. 1, p. 237. The whole history of the
ratification of the Constitution is one of insistence upon the inclusion of a bill of rights,
the fear that central government would be too strong, the release of the nilitia from
martial law except in time of war. Any opposition to these protections was not based
on their undesirability but on the assertion that under our system of delegated powers
no supremacy of the military, no infringement of basic rights, no usurpation of power
could occur. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, VOL. 1, pp. 325, 327, 334 ff.; vol. 2, pp. 32, 80, 123, 220,
251, 269, 316, 359, 398, 429, 435, 449, 455, 545 ff.; vol.'3, pp. 52, 317, 445, 449, 502, 649,
651, 660, are typical examples. See also Madison's remarks, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., June
8, 1789; also WARREN, op. cit. supra note 50, at 508, 769.
It should not be forgotten that the men whose views we are citing had just gone through
seven years of war, the outstanding feature of which was the hindrances to our military
effort by the weak Confederation government; yet with all this the one point on which
more people agreed than on any other was the necessity for restricting the central power
from encroaching upon their basic liberties by military authority or otherwise.
As Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941) 30, points out: "The first ten
amendments were drafted by men who had just been through a war. The Third and
Fifth Amendments expressly apply in war."
James A. Randall in Constitutional Problems under Lincoln (1926) 25-26 has sum-
marized very concisely the American position of the military power:
"Under the old German system, it was 'Within the competence of the Kaiser to
proclaim a 'state of war' throughout Germany, and thus to inaugurate a sweeping
military regime.-...
"In contrast to this extension of executive action, during war, the Anglo-Saxon
tendency has been always to emphasize the 'rule of law', and to regard the military
power as subordinate to the civil....
"The law of military necessity, however, is not the typical American principle.
To say that military force is not to be restrained by the superior power of law, is
to quote the militaristic view as against that which has always prevailed here.
"Even during war the person and property rights of the citizen, according to the
Anglo-Saxon viewpoint, must be preserved."
Even many of the state constitutions contain provisions assuring the supremacy of the
civil power; e.g. West Virginia.
Nor can it be gainsaid that the rationale of the majority and minority opinions in
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866) is that the civil power is supreme over the
military, a position which has not, so far as I am aware, been denied in any comment
on the case.5 2RANDALL, op. cit. supra note 47, at 30; H. R. REP'. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942) 147.
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emergency cannot create power,53 that the question should by now be fore-
closed from debate.
It may be difficult to define or even to list all the fundamental rights to
which individuals are entitled under our system of government. Certain it is
that the principle that men are endowed with certain "inalienable rights" is
well grounded. 54 A partial list of some of these rights possibly involved in
our problem appears in Footnote 55 and may prove helpful.
A. Extent of the Federal Police Power in Wartime
The above enumeration of the basic characteristics of our system of law
53EX parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942) ; Schechter v. United States,
295 U. S. 495, 528, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 842 (1934); Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct 231 (1933); Highland v. Russell Car Co., 279 U. S.
253, 261, 49 Sup. Ct. 314, 316 (1928) ; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81,
88, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, 299 (1920); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146,
155, 40 Sup. Ct. 106, 108 (1919); and Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).54In Magna Charta in 1215; Bill of Rights in 1688; Declaration of Independence in
1776; Articles of Confederation, and state and Federal Constitutions.
5 5Right of free movement. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164
(1941). "The conclusion that the right of free movement is a right of national citizen-
ship stands on firm historical ground." See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 48
(U. S. 1867) ; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. 128 (1900) ; United States
v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 41 Sup. Ct. 133 (1920) ; and Note (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 1032.
Right to occupation, home, family, knowledge, worship, etc. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U. S. 390, 399, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 626 (1922) : "While this court has not attempted to
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much considera-
tion, and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." See also
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 10 (1915).
Right to live and work where onw wills. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589,
17 Sup. Ct. 427, 431 (1897); and Colgate v. Harvey, 269 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252
(1925).
Right to protection by government in the blessings of life, liberty, property and occul-
pation. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3,230 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1823) ; Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (U. S. 1804) ; and Butchers' Union S. H. &
L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City, 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652 (1883).
Right to peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievaiwes. United States v.
Cruickshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875).
Right to discuss national issues. Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954
(1938).
Right to immunity from denial of voting or similar privileges because of race. United
States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1875) ; and Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct.
152 (1884).
These rights have been said to be "fundamental rights which belong to every citizen
as a member of society" (United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875), "vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions" (Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U. S.
147, 161, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 151 (1939), and "immutable principles of justice which inhere
in the very idea of free government" (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389, 18 Sup. Ct.
383, 387 (1897).
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and the rights of individuals suggests that the evacuation of persons of Jap-
anese ancestry from the west coast has cut more deeply across those basic
rights than has any government regulation thus far attempted. It is a common-
place that all private rights: property, personal, even life itself, are held subject
to the public right of regulation in the common interest and that the right of
private dominion is always in greater or less collision with the right of public
control.56 It would be simple to deny the government all right of control and
make personal rights absolute, or to grant the government unfettered control
and make government totalitarian. Our task, however, is more difficult, but
more fruitful. As Aristotle remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book V: "The
easiest thing for the judge-or legislator-to do is to be strict and forbid. It
is much more difficult to attempt to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable,
conserving the just in the claims of each side, and rendering a full measure
of distributive justice to each." Our problem is to find a position sufficiently
protective of the interests of government, which will nevertheless preserve to
the individual citizen the greatest measure of those rights for the preservation
of which government is itself formed.
We are indebted to government counsel in the Hirabayashi case, and to the
recognized authority on martial law, Charles Fairman, for dispelling the idea
which has pervaded much of the thinking on federal power in time of war,
that declarations of "martial law" or "military necessity" or operations under
"war powers" are determinative or even helpful in defining the extent of the
power.57 The plain and simple fact remains that we are exploring the bound-
aries of the "police power" under specific exigencies.
1. J.idicial Approach and Definition of Federal Police Power in Wartime.-
Thus having defined the problem and our basic legal concepts, we need to
explore first the rules which have been developed to determine the right of
the state, both in "peace" and "war," to regulate or prevent the use of one or
56West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 57& (1936) ; Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U. S. 502, 523-5, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 510-11 (1933) ; Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 188 (1910) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358 (1904) ; and Commonwealth v. Alger, 7. Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851).
See also 1 THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895) 693, and Walter Wheeler
Cook, What Is the Police Power (1907) 7 COL. L. REV. 322.57Charles Fairman, author of The Law of Martial Ride and the National Emergency(1930) 55 HAliv. L. REv. 1253, is quoted as saying, concerning the evacuation: "The
question in every case of military control would still be, (even with a martial law
declaration) can the action complained of be justified as apparently reasonable and
appropriate, under the circumstances, to the defense of the nation and the prosecution
of the war?" San Francisco Chronicle, March 4, 1942, 14. See also the same position
taken in his excellent article: Fairman, The Law of Martial Ride and the National
Emergency (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 1253; Brief for Government, p. 42 ff., Hirabayashi
v. United States. 2 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1929) 1591.
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more of an individual's basic rights, and, second, the attitude or general philos-
ophy by which the courts have and should approach this inevitable collision of
private and public rights.
Throughout the evacuation episode runs the attitude of unwillingness to
trust any person of Japanese ancestry. Typical of this is the expression of
Mayor Riley of Portland: "I wouldn't take a chance with one."5 8 Is this the
approach to the necessity for evacuation? Or is the approach that expressed
in Kwock Jan Fat v. White,59 "It is better that many Chinese immigrants
should be improperly admitted than that one natural born citizen of the United
States should be permanently excluded from his country." 60
On April 13, 1943, General DeWitt, whose orders are the subject of our
inquiry, was reported by the press as saying: "A Jap is a Jap . .. it makes
no difference whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen. . . . The west
coast is too vulnerable ... to take any chances." 61 On May 17, the Supreme
Court in John T. Regan v. King,62 recognized that there must continue to be
a distinction between Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese
ancestry and refused to reconsider the rule in the Wong Kim Ark case. 63 In
Ex parte Z~awato,64 Justice Black speaking for the Court said:
"Nothing in this record indicates, and we cannot assume, that he [a
Japanese alien] came to America for any purpose different from that
which prompted millions of others to seek our shores-a chance to make
his home and work in a free country, governed by just laws, which
promise equal protection to all who abide by them."
Clearly the Supreme Court requires a more trustful and fair attitude than has
been employed by those who advocated and directed the evacuation.
Wherever individual rights and public rights are in opposition, there are
-two ends to the problem-the "protection of individual rights" end and the
"risk to the public" end.65 It would seem that the courts of a country which
starts its history with the wording of the Declaration of Independence, carries
the same philosophy into the Constitution, surrounds its civil and criminal
procedures with protections of the individual, and is currently waging a war
48H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 146.
59253 U. S. 454, 49 Sup. Ct. 566 (1919).66This is in keeping with the maxim that "it is better that 99 guilty escape than that
one innocent man be punished."61See the Washington Post, April 15, 1943; San Francisco News, April 13, 1943, 1.
62.- U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1168 (1943).63United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456 (1897) holding that
a person born in the United States of Japanese parents is an American citizen with all
the attendant rights of citizenship, on a par with all other citizens.64317 U. S. 69, 63 Sup. Ct. 115 (1942).
6 5 Chaffee, The Bill of Rights Belongs to the People (1942) 2 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 92.
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for "four freedoms," which mean nothing except in terms of the individual,
must always think first of the individual rights, rather than the risk. In my
opinion the evacuation has been almost entirely the product of "risk fixation,"
to employ a psychologist's terminology.
It appears that the view which the Supreme Court has developed in dealing
with personal or civil rights cases has properly laid stress on private protec-
tion, rather than public risk. The general presumptions of constitutionality
of legislation and of the reasonableness of classification, and the refusal to
inquire into the policy of legislation 66 are recognized as the essence of judicial
restraint and separation of powers. But this concession does not explore the
issue deeply enough to be determinative. It may be that the tendency has
been to refuse to draw tight the circle of inviolability about property.67 The
increased vigilance in protecting personal rights is the more manifest.68
Gradually the distinction has been worked out. A liberal construction of the
first ten amendments in favor of the individual, was first recognized.6 9 The
power to abridge personal liberties became considered "the exception rather
than the rule."70 Astuteness in examining legislation charged to abridge basic
freedoms was manifested in the same period.71 A query was stated whether
"there may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face ...to be within the first ten
amendments. ' 72 In Schneider v. Irvngton3 the following year, justice Rob-
erts went on to answer the question:
"In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of the rights
is asserted, the courts should be astute to ekamine the effect of the chal-
6 6United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 784(1937); Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 209, 55 Sup. Ct. 187,
191-192 (1934) ; Corporation Commission v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431, 50 Sup. Ct. 397 (1929) ;
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1919) ; and Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 625 (U. S. 1820).67 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 144, 58 Sup. Ct. 778 (1937); Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1933);
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1920); and Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries, 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919).6 8Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1939) ; Schneider v. State of
New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939) ; Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496,
59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939) ; and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1021 (1937).69Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206, 53 Sup. Ct. 138 (1932) ; Grau v. United States,
287 U. S. 124, 53 Sup. Ct. 38 (1932) ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52
Sup. Ct. 420 (1931) ; and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 51
Sup. Ct. 153 (1930).
71 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 258, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 739 (1936).
71DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1936) ; and Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1937) and cases cited therein.7 2 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 783
(1937).
73308 U. S. 147, 161, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 150 (1939).
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lenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting mat-
ters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions."
This decision has been generally accepted as giving "authoritative substance
to the theory that there may be no room for the presumption of constitutional-
ity, usually accorded state or municipal legislation, where the statute or ordi-
nance interferes with a civil liberty as distinguished from legislative impair-
ment of an economic privilege. ' 74 This approach has since been followed
by the Court.75 It is submitted that there is a real distinction authorizing this
difference of approach. In the ordinary case involving constitutionality, gov-
ernment action either is being tested against the rule that this is a system of
"express powers" or is being subjected to negative limitations. It is proper
then that government should not be crippled, should be "allowed a little play
in its joints. '76 And it is sufficient that only action which is arbitrary and
wholly unreasonable be prevented. But individual rights are as specifically
provided for by the Constitution as are governmental powers; in fact govern-
ment was created for their protection. When these rights are involved, the
limitation on governmental power is not as important as is the limitation on
the individual's rights. Here the Court should itself determine, as umpire
between government and the people, the extent to which the public need should
be curtailed and some public risk be accepted and the degree to which cardinal
freedoms should be overridden.
The Court in the Hague and Schneider decisions, carried this attitude
protective of individual rights even further in a manner particularly applicable
to the evacuation program. The evacuation has been justified as necessary
to "protect" persons of Japanese ancestry against violence and vigilantism.
In the Hague case the same argument was made, but the Court held that the
city must meet threatened disorder by police protection instead of the more
74(1940) 40 CoL. L. RFv. 531, 532.75Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939) ; Carlson v. California,
310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1939) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct.
736 (1939) ;and Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939). See also
Opelika, Fort Smith, Casa Grande and other Jehovah!s Witnesses cases of 1943. Note
that this approach stems back to earlier dissenting opinions. Burns Baking Co. et al.
v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 517, 520, 44 Sup. Ct. 412, 415, 416 (1924) ; and Adams v. Tanner,
244 U. S. 590, 597, 600, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 665, 666 (1916). Although in Miewrsville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1939) the Court seemed less soliditous
of these rights. The Court engaged in no presumption and now entertains the same
question for reconsideration (following the unexpected suppression of Jehovah's Witness
activity after the Gobitis case supra). As this article goes to press, the Supreme Court
has on June 14, 1943, reversed the Gobitis case.76Justice Holmes in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 51 Sup. Ct. 228 (1930).
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efficient method of refusal of permits which interfered more seriously with
the right of assembly. The threat of lawless conduct was no justification for
depriving the innocent of their rights.77 In the Schneider case the argument
was advanced that the most efficient method of preventing fraudulent appeals,
littering of the streets, and trespassing was to prohibit dissemination of in-
formation and pamphlets without permit. Again the Court required the less
efficient method of ascertainment of guilt and punishment, since this would
interfere less with basic liberties. 78 Against this background, what standing
has the argument in favor of evacuation that it constituted "protective
custody"70 or that the difficulty of sorting out the disloyal by the method of
individual hearing required the internment of the whole population of Japanese
ancestry ?
The two arguments most frequently used in support of the evacuation pro-
gram and similar war measures: (1) that "the power to wage war is the
power to wage war successfully," 80 and (2) President Lincoln's homely words
"by general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be
amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb,"8'
77 This same argument of "prevention of conflict" was presented to the Supreme Court
in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 69, 81, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 20 (1917), and was similarly
rejected: "It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by
preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation of
public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the federal Constitution."
7 8"Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets
as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection
of the freedom of speech and press .... the public convenience in respect of cleanliness
of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the free
communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution." Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 162-3, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 151 (1939).
"Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law. Trespasses may similarly
be forbidden. If it is said that these means are less efcient and convenient than bestowal
of power on police authorities to decide what information may be disseminated from house
to house, and who may impart the information, the answer is that considerations of this
sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press." Id. at 164,
60 Sup. Ct. at 152 (1939). This was but a more specific application of the rule stated in
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1916) ; Schlesinger
v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 Sup. Ct. 260 (1925) ; and Weaver v. Paler Brothers,
270 U. S. 402, 46 Sup. Ct. 320 (1925).
79There have been true cases of "protective custody" by the military. An example was
the placing of Round Valley in California under martial law as a protection to the
Indians, against whom the whites were committing outrages-but the Indians were left
in the enjoyment of their property and liberties and the action was taken against the
whites. See WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFIcIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CON-
FEDERATE APIutES, Series I, Vol. 50, pt. 2, pp. 218, 219, 310.
80Hughes, War Powers under the Constitution (1917) 42 A. B. A. REP. 237, 238;
Brief for Government, p. 47 ff., Hirabayashi v. United States.8 1 Fairman, The Law of M1artial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 55 HARV.
L. REv. 1253, 1278.
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seem to carry "argument by metaphor beyond what sound constitutional theory
will justify. Amputation of a limb is a "last ditch" remedy and some risk to
life is always attempted before this drastic step is taken. The "wage war
successfully" argument is used to brand the war power as "plenary" and to
suggest that the determination of the military commander must be accepted.
This approach is wholly at variance with the attitude already discussed and
its application to the exercise of war powers. From the earliest times, both in
England8 2 and in the United States 3 the courts refused to accept the decision
of the military and insisted on making a determination de novo of the necessity
for military action infringing individual liberties.84 Viewed from every angle
it appears that the Supreme Court has recognized, both in war and in peace,
that private rights must be pro tected even at some risk to the public generally
and that the Court shall decide when and to what extent such risk must be
accepted.
Developed concurrently with the rule restricting the presumption of con-
stitutionality, has been the rule that in order to justify the invasion of indi-
vidual rights, the danger to society must be "imminent and impending" or
"clear and present."8 5 'This test has been devised to meet not only the stress
of peacetime emergency but also the exigencies of war. To most lawyers the
history of the adoption of this rule during the last war is known: how expo-
nents of civil liberties had previously insisted that no act was punishable unless
82The case of the Bristol Rights (S. T. U. S. III, 2-56), 1932, cited in 3 WILLOUGHBY,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 1591.83Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (U. S. 1851) : "It is not enough to show that
he exercised an honest judgment, and took the property to promote the public service, he
must also prove what the nature of the emergency was, or what he had reasonable
grounds to believe it to be; and it will then bd for the court and jury t6 say whether it
was so pressing as to justify an invasion of private right."
S4 Although the unguarded dictum in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849) and
the severely criticized opinion in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235 (1909)
relaxed this rule, the Court in Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932)
returned to its former position, relying on the Mitchell case. It may be that under the
Sterling case there is a "range of honest judgment permitted," but the military judgment
is not conclusive. See also Jones v. Securities Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 23, 56 Sup. Ct.
654, 660-661 (1935) ; and Ex parte Orzoco, 201 Fed. 106 (W. D. Tex. 1912).8 5 To the student of jurisprudence it will appear that this constitutes a replacement of
the rule prevalent at the formation of this country and expressed particularly by Jefferson
(see PAovER, D)EmocRAcY BY THOTrAS JEFFERSON) which permitted of no group control
by the "utilitarian" rule permitting governmental regulation of these rights in. the common
good, a position associated with Bentham and Mill, and more recently with Holmes and
Brandeis. See: BEINTHAm, THE Boor OF FALLACIES; MILL, UTILITARIANISM; Holmes,
J., in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655, 49 Sup. Ct. 448, 451 (1928);
Brandeis, J., in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375-77, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 648-649
(1926). A more critical examination of the cases will prove that the replacement has
not been complete and that the tendency is toward the preservation of the individual
rights to the greatest extent possible, while permitting regulation only to the extent
necessary.
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it actually resulted in inciting criminal acts ;s6 then in the five cases argued at
the October term in 1918 the "clear and present danger" test was stated and
such danger was found to exist in language that hindered the recruiting of
an army ;87 in Gitlow v. New York it appeared the Court might accept sup-
pression of "threatened danger in its incipiency" as the criterion ;88 but the
Court finally reestablished the "clear and present danger" test to meet the
exigencies of the depression years.8 9 In the later cases the test has been
applied to disapprove of governmental action9" and sociological balancing of
the preservation of individual rights against the risk to society has been
employed, even when the danger was "present," to determine how "clear"
was the danger.91
What is perhaps not so well understood is the relation of this test to the
general power of government in time of war. If we go back to the earlier
86 CHAFFE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNIzED STATES (1941); Wechsler, Symposium on
Civil Liberties (1941) 9 Am. L. SCHOOL REv. 881, 882; Murrish, Protection of Free
Speech utnder the Federal Constitution (1940) 28 CALIF. L. REv. 733. In one of the first
cases decided during the first World War, Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535
(S. D. N. Y. 1917), District Judge Learned Hand accepted this test.87See Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919) ; Baer v. United States, 249 U. S. 47,
39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919); Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 Sup. Ct. 191
(1918); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249 (1918); Debs v.
United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct. 252 (1918).
89268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1924).89Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732 (1936). There are those who
find a clear return to this rule as early as Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct.
655 (1927) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927) ; and Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
90See cases cited note 89 .upra, and see note 91 infra.911n Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 744 (1939), although
the Court recognized a present danger, it balanced the value of labor organization against
internal order and employer's rights- and found certain risks worth taking "in the circum-
stances of our times . . . [to preserve] the area of free discussion that is guaranteed by
the Constitution." And in Lovell v. City of Griflin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1937) ;
Schneider v. New Jersey (and companion cases), 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939) ;
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1936) Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S.
496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939) ; Cantuell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900
(1939) though it was clear that some "danger" or risk was present, the Court permitted
free discussion to prevail. Even in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586,
60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1939), where the alleged danger was to national unity, "an interest
inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values" (310 U. S. 586 at 595, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010
at 1013) the Court balanced values. The chief criticism of the case is that it over-
emphasizes the salute as a path to unity. Now the Court is reconsidering the case, a
recognition that even in this area perhaps sufficient attention was not given to the need
for protecting individual rights. On June 14, concurrently with this article's going to
press, this case has been reversed on a rebalancing of considerations. The Court in
Bridges v. State of California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941,) and Times-Mirror
Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941) again followed the clear
and present danger test and found no such danger as justified citation for contempt of
court. In addition to considering the nearness of the danger, it considered the interest
threatened and the likely effect of their decision.
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precedents defining the limits and conditions for the exercise of military power,
we shall find that here also is the requirement of proximity and degree, a
"clear and present" or "immediate, imminent, and impending" danger. Thus
Charles Fairman has traced the beginnings of "martial law" or military con-
trol to the common law principle of "measures necessary to preserve the realm
and resist the enemy," 92 which was analogous to protection of one's person or
property by force. 9 3 Each of these principles recognized liability (lack of
justification) if the danger was not real or imminent, or the means employed
exceeded the occasion. 94
If we look to the few cases in this country which have stated the rule to
be applied in testing the action of the government through the military branch,
as it affects individual rights, we shall find the same rule of "imminent danger"
and the same tendency to balance the conflicting interests in favor of the indi-
vidual and against government, which we have seen develop in other civil
liberties fields.9 5 Two cases involving the taking of property in time of war,
on the claim that it was necessary in order to prevent its falling into the hands
of the enemy, serve as illustrations. In United States v. Russell,96 the rule
was stated as "the public danger must be immediate, imminent, and impending,
and the emergency in the public service must be extreme and imperative, and
such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any other source of supply."
In Mitchell v. Harmony,9 7 since the evidence showed that the seizure was for
the purpose of using the property in a forthcoming campaign, rather than to
prevent the property coming into the enemy's possession, the plaintiff was
allowed to recover against the military officer. The Court's language is very
clear:
"But in every such case the danger must be present or impending, and
the necessity such as does not admit of delay or the intervention of the
civil authority to provide the requisite means. It is impossible to define
the particular circumstances in which the power may be lawfully exercised.
Every case must depend on its own circumstances. It is the emergency
92Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 55 HARv.
L. REV. 1253, 1256-1264.
931d. at 1260.
94Id. at 1261-1264; 3 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES(2d ed. 1929) 1591. A further recognition of this are the "Indemnity Acts" which have
been passed in England and the United States, after military control which may have
exceeded the necessity. 2 MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 256-8; M1itchell
v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 647, 4 Sup. Ct. 170 (1883); WAR OF THE REBELLION: 0. R.,
op. cit. supra note 79, Series I, vol. 2, pp. 21-30.95See notes 89, 90, and 91 mtpra.
9613 Wall. 623, 627-8 (U. S. 1871).
9713 How. 115 (U. S. 1851) ; see also Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U. S. 712, 716 (1875).
The test of "imminent danger" is that fixed by the Constitution as justification for the
use of a state's war powers. U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 10.
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that gives the right, and the emergency must be shown before the taking
can be justified. In deciding upon this necessity, the state of facts as they
appeared at the time will govern the decision, because the officer in com-
mand must act upon the information of others as well as his own observa-
tion. And if, with such information as he can obtain, there is reasonable
ground for believing that the peril is immediate or the necessity urgent,
he may do what the occasion seems to require, and the discovery that he
was mistaken will not make him a wrongdoer. It is not enough to show
that he exercised an honest judgment, and took the property to promote
the public service, he must also prove what the nature of the emergency
was, or what he had reasonable grounds to believe it to be; and it will
then be for the court and jury to say whether it was so pressing as to
justify an invasion of private right."
More recently the Court made clear that a danger more proximate than
has, I believe, been shown to exist on the west coast must be shown before
military control will be justified. Said Chief Justice Hughes :s
"The absence of necessity for military order of the Governor . . . is
established by showing that there was no actual uprising or showing of
violence or anything more than threats of violence, breaches of the peace
against oil producers, and that there was no closure of the courts or failure
of civil authorities."
2. Thw History of Governmental Action in Time of War.-The other guide
in determining rules to be applied now is found in action previously taken
by the government in time of war, whether or not sustained by the courts,
weighed in the light of the similarities or differences of the times. We can
first dispose of a considerable number of cases, often cited but having little
bearing on the problem in hand. Thus methods of raising an army and pro-
viding munitions fall within specific constitutional authorization.99 War merely
demonstrates the public nature of the use in taking private property with
-compensation in other cases.10  Or national conditions created by war bring
areas which were formerly subject to state police power under federal juris-
diction.110 The control of enemy aliens and their property is recognized and
98Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932).99Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1935) ;
Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197 (1934) ;
and Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1917).
'
0OHighland v. Russell Car and Snowplow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1929) ;
Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507 (1919); and
Northern Pacific Ry. Co, v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502 (1919).
lOiBlock v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1920) (rents) ; Hamilton v. Ken-
tucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919) (sale of liquor) ; McKinley
v. United States, 249 U. S. 397, 39 Sup. Ct. 324 (1918) (prostitution near army camps);
and Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493 (U. S. 1870).
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plenary.1 2 The freedom of speech cases have been treated elsewhere.'0 3
On October 6, 1775, the first Congress of Delegates recommended to the
colonial assemblies that they confine any person who might endanger the
liberties of America.10 4 We know that some Tories assisting the British cause
were in fact apprehended. The Continental Congress was upheld in compel-
ling the removal of articles which might fall into the hands of the enemy.'" 5
The history of the Alien and Sedition Laws and the practical restriction of
these to alien enemies has already been noted.10 6 Although Washington called
out the army during the Whiskey Rebellion, arrests were made only on war-
rant issued by a judge for specific crimes shown, 07 and in the Burr Conspiracy
of 1805 civil agencies alone were employed.' 0 8 In 1812,'our coastline was
invaded by the British and our Capitol was burned; under these circumstances
removal of alien enemies above tidewater was upheld.0 9
In the same period, the military attempted to control citizens, at least when
they were suspected of being spies, but these were directed by the President
to be released,110 and General Jackson's imposition of military control at New
Orleans over civilians, and his refusal to heed a writ of habeas corpus resulted
in his having to pay a $1,000 fine.:"' The Mexican War saw no great inter-
ference with private rights, but the Supreme Court was astute to uphold an
individual's right to recover for private property taken by a military officer
without justification. 112
It was the Civil War which produced a considerable amount of executive
control over individual rights. James G. Randall has summarized some of the
powers which President Lincoln claimed to exercise:
"As interpreted by President Lincoln, the war power specifically in-
20 2 Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. 214 (1920) ; The Prize
Cases, 2 Black 635 (U. S. 1862) ; and Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 (U. S. 1870).
10 3See notes 68-75, 91 supra. After Schenck and related cases, the other cases uphold-
ing convictions under the Espionage Act, United States v. Abrams, 250 U. S. 616, 40
Sup. Ct. 17 (1919), Schaeffer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1919),
Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 205 (1919), were by divided courts,
with Holmes and Brandeis, whose views shaped the present rule of law, taking the posi-
tion that the writings there denouncing our intervention in Russia and criticising our
war strength should not be suppressed.
1041 Eu.IOr's DEBATES 50.
105Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (U. S. 1788).106 See note 7 supra, and also 2 BEVERiDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919)
381 ff.; BoWERs, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(1937) 375 ff.
1072 MCMASTER, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES (1927) 190.
1082 WANDELL AND MINNEGERODE, AARON BURR (1927) 118-145.
10 9See notes 6 and 7 supra.
1'0 s parte Quirin et al., 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).
111J. S. BASSTT, LIFE OF JACKSON (1911) 224-230.
112 Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (U. S. 1851).
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cluded the right to determine the existence of 'rebellion' and call forth
the militia to suppress it; the right to increase the regular army by call-
ing for volunteers beyond the authorized total; the right to suspend the
habeas corpus privilege; the right to proclaim martial law; the right to
place persons under arrest without warrant and without judicially show-
ing the cause of detention; the right to seize citizens' property if such
seizure should become indispensable to the successful prosecution of the
war; the right to spend money from the treasury of the United States
without congressional appropriation; the right to suppress newspapers;
and the right to do unusual things by proclamation, especially to pro-
claim freedom to the slaves of those in arms against the Government."" 3
Lincoln's apology, in his letter of June 12, 1863, for the action taken is
one of his great writings and goes far to prove the enormity of the emergency,
rebellion in the North itself, and conditions in the courts bordering on
anarchy. 1 4 Five famous cases growing out of the exercise by Lincoln and
his generals of the war power are instructive: Miller v. United States,"5
Ex parte Merryman,116 Ex parte Vallandigham,"17 Ex parte Milligan,"18 and
the Prize Cases."19
The Miller case and the Prize Cases faced the problem that persons residing
in the South were still technically citizens, but either they or their states were
carrying on a rebellion against the central government. It was determined
that a state of war existed between the southern states and the central govern-
ment and that citizens of the southern states were "enemies" so that trading
with them might be forbidden or their goods seized. Although this theory of
"war" has been severely criticised, it is probably as good a description of a
situation dearly "extra" the Constitution as any other phrase.
Merryman was a lieutenant drilling a secessionist company in Baltimore, a
city in 1861 actively opposed to the war effort and on the only direct railroad
line from the North to Washington. Troops moving through Baltimore to
defend Washington had been set upon by a mob and the city and state had
refused to take action ;120 General Cadwalader took Merryman into custody
and, pursuant to presidential authorization, suspended the writ of habeas
corpus. Chief Justice Taney wrote his famous opinion asserting that only
"13RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926) 36.
1148 NICOLAY AND HAY, WORKS (1894) 298.
115l1 Wall. 268 (U. S. 1870).
11617 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9,487 (1861).
1171 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1863).
1184 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
1192 Black 635 (U. S. 1862).
12 0See FAiRM-AN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1939) ch. 4; THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION: OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES,
Series 2, vol. 5, pp. 226, 564;' and RANDALL, op. cit. supra note 47, at 161.
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Congress could suspend the writ and leaving it to the President to cause "the
civil process of the United States to be enforced." The sequel to that case must
be noted. Soon after this opinion Merryman was transferred to a civil court,
charged with treason (for destruction of railroad bridges), and released on
bail. The case was delayed until after the war, when the charges were
dropped.
121
Vallandigham was an outstanding Copperhead politician of Ohio. Morgan
and his raiders were preparing to, and later did, invade Ohio in the hopes of
an uprising of Copperheads. General Burnside placed Vallandigham on trial
before a military tribunal for the sentiments he had uttered. The district judge
denied the writ of habeas corpus. A vain attempt to get the case to the
Supreme Court for review was made by requesting certiorari of the military-
tribunal record, which of course was refused as not within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court. President Lincoln disapproved of Burnside's action,
and commuted Vallandigham's sentence to removal within the Confederate
lines, which was effected. 122
, Milligan held much the same position in Indiana which Vallandigham did
in Ohio. He was arrested in 1864, charged and found guilty by a military
tribunal of conspiracy to overthrow the government. Morgan had invaded
Indiana in 1863; the Southern cause seemed at its height; the pro-Southern
movement in Indiana was substantial. When the case came before the Supreme
Court all the justices agreed that Congress had not authorized trial by the
military commission. The majority, by Justice Davis, went on to deny that
Congress had the power to establish "martial law" except in case of actual,
present invasion. The minority, by Chief justice Chase, believed that Congress
had the power in cases of "imminent public danger," "where ordinary law no
longer adequately secures public safety and private rights.' 23 The Milligan
case, though the dictum of the majority has been severely criticized, has been
accepted as stating the applicable rules of law in other particulars as late as
1942.124 The government now admits that both the majority and minority in
1 2 1 SvISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935) 557; see also note 120 supra.
122For this history see: Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Enter-
gency, (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1283; RANDALL, op. cit. supra note 47, at 179;
NICOLAY AND HAY, op. cit. supra note 114, at 336, 345, 360; and Lincoln's Letter to
Burnside: "All the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandig-
ham-some perhaps doubting that there was a real necessity for it, but being done all
are for seeing you through with it." THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.: OFFICIAL RECORDS
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, Series 2, vol. 5, pp. 717, 657, 705.
1234 Wall. 2, 140, 142 (U. S. 1866). For the general background see Fairman, Tile
Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergeicy (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1284.
124E.xr parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).
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the Milligan case were right in holding that there was no "military necessity"
for the action taken against Milligan.125
The Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863, had the effect of recognizing the
supremacy of the civil power and of freeing all persons held by the military if
grand juries did not find indictments for crimes committed. 120 There were
cases not as famous as the above five, and incidents other than cases, which
show that in spite of the untoward danger to the Union, the basic civil rights
were protected against military action.1
27
In both the Revolutionary War and the Civil War we have noted that
persons who assisted those opposed to the government were interned by the
military without trial. It appears to me that in the recent case of Ex parte
Quirin the Court has recognized a distinction between this type of detention
and the present detention of persons of Japanese ancestry. In the Quirin. case
the Court took great pains to point out that the military had a right to control
Haupt, the only American citizen among the saboteurs, on the basis that
"citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy govern-
ment ... are enemy belligerents," to be treated as such under the laws of war.
Where, as in the Revolution, when there was no "citizenship," or in the Civil
War when rebellion made "citizenship" only technical, it might be proper to
treat those who assisted the "enemy" as "enemy belligerents." That would
justify the military detention of persons of Japanese ancestry who could be
proven to be aiding the enemy; but such determination of the military would,
be subject to judicial review just as at present judicial review may be had to
125Brief for Government, Hirabayashi v. United States.
126RAhNDALL, Op. cit. supra note 47, at 163-164, 189.
127Abrams, The Jeffersonian, Copperhead Newspaper (1942) 2 BILL oF RIGHTS REv.
284 describes the recovery by the owner of the Jeffersonian due to its suppression. Roscoe
Pound, War and the Law (1943) 14 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 242, 248 depicts both the emer-
gency background and official reaction thus: "In the summer of 1863, when Lee was
moving on Pennsylvania, Morgan was preparing to invade Ohio, Rosecrans was stalled
in Middle Tennessee, and Johnston was collecting an army in Grant's rear behind Vicks-
burg, there was an emergency if our, country ever encountered one. But General Burn-
side's order suspending the Chicago Times for 'repeated expressions of disloyal and
incendiary sentiments' was at once revoked by President Lincoln. In the summer of
1864, after Cold Harbor, after the operations about Petersburg seemed to have reached a
standstill, when Sherman seemed to be making little headway toward Atlanta, and Early
was in the Shenandoah Valley, a great political party was allowed to hold a convention
which in its platform pronounced the war a failure. Joel Parker at the Harvard Law
School was allowed to attack the legality of important items of the administration's
policy. There was a protracted newspaper controversy between the partisans of Meade
and of Sickles as to the conduct of the battle of Gettysburg. After Shiloh, during the
long struggle to get a foothold back of Vicksburg, and after Cold Harbor, Grant was
persistently attacked in the press. But the attacks were without effect on his imper-
turbable pursuit of his duty, and neither helped the South nor hindered the military
operations of the North."
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determine whether a person held as an alien is in fact such. 2 8Internment of aliens or citizens during World Wars I and II presents
different questions in England and in the United States. In England during
the First World War, the Defense of the Realm Act'2 9 provided for exclusion
from defense areas, and internment on suspicion, of persons thought to be
aiding the enemy. The power was lodged in civilian agencies. This action
was upheld in Bonnfeldt v. Phillips'30 and Res v. Halliday.'-31 In 1941 the
House of Lords upheld, in the Liversidge and Greene cases,' 32 under the
Emergency Powers Act of 1939133 and Regulation 18B, internment on the
order of the Home Secretary "with a view to preventing [the person held]
acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defense of the realm."
The decision turned on the issue of statutory construction: whether Parliament
had lodged power in the Home Secretary to make the determination of preju-
dice or hostility objectively (of which courts should judge) or subjectively
(of which he would be the sole judge). The court adopted the latter inter-
pretation, but not without a strong dissent by Lord Atkin, who quoted the
words of Pollock: "in a case in which the liberty of the subject is concerned
we cannot go beyond the natural construction of the statute." The case was
severely criticized by Carleton Kemp Allen in April, 1942.134 In Canada, the
War Measures Act'15 also lodges powers of exclusion in a cikilan, the Minister
of Justice, who has issued regulations excluding persons of the Japanese race
from certain limited 'military areas, but not confining them in camps and
allowing them to return to these areas under permit issued by the Mounted
Police.18 6 These cases must not be considered precedents for American
action.137 Although England has a tradition of protecting civil liberties not
unlike our own, its constitutional theory is entirely different. Its Constitution
is the Common Law as modified by Parliament; Parliament is the Constitu-
tion. As F. A. Brewing, in speaking of these statutes and decisions, says:
12SEx parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942) ; Ex parte Gilroy, 257 Fed. 110
(S. D. N. Y. 1919) ; Ex parte Risse, 257 Fed. 102 (S. D. N. Y. 1919) ; and EX parte
Fronklin, 253 Fed. 984 (N. D. Miss. 1918). REP. ATr'Y GEN. (1918). 35.
1294 & 5 GEo. V, c. 29; 5 & 6 G.Eo. V, c. 8.
13035 T. L. R. 46 (K. B. 1916).
131(1917) A. C. 260.
132Liversidge v. Anderson, [19421 A. C. 206, 3 All Eng. 338 (1941) ; Greene v. Secre-
tary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] A. C. 284. Carr, A Regulated Liberty (1942)
42 CoL. L. REv. 339.
1332 & 3 GEO. VI, c. 62.
134Allen, Regulation 18b and Reasonable Cause (1942) 58 L. Q. REv. 232.
13 5REv. STAT. CANADA 1927, c. 206.
136Canada Gazette, Extra No. 96, August 31, 1942.
137Note the action of the highest court of Australia setting aside, in a case involving
Jehovah's Witnesses, virtually all subversive activities regulations. Associated Press,
June 14, 1943.
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"The Imperial Parliament is absolute and can, of course, abrogate any civil
liberty it sees fit.' u 3 8 Even where power is thus absolute it should be noted
that Parliament has lodged the discretion in civilian agencies, and has itself
kept constant control by requiring that all regulations must be submitted to
and passed by Parliament before they are effective. 139
In the United States, World War I was marked by a liberalization of the
treatment of enemy aliens so that only disloyal or dangerous aliens were
interned;140 even then the Attorney General pointed out in his 1918 report
that such internment was "anomalous under the American judicial system,
in that it provides for the summary exercise of executive authority .... ,,14
A statute was proposed in Congress which would have divided this country
into military districts subject to regulations to be adopted by the military com-
manders. President Wilson wrote to Senator Overman:
"I am wholly and unalterably opposed to such legislation.... I think
it is not only unconstitutional, but that in character it would put us nearly
upon the level of the very people we are fighting .... It would be alto-
gether inconsistent with the spirit and practice of America .... I think
it is unnecessary and uncalled for.... :.12
In Stoutenburgh v. Frazier,43 the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia gave the only consideration, of which I know, to an Act of Congress
permitting the confinement of a person as subject to suspicion.. Although this
was one of the wartime acts and could have been construed to authorize
"preventive custody" only after a hearing, the court held the act unconstitu-
tional. On December 26, 1941, Congress authorized the Commissioners of the
District of Columbia to evacuate (but not to intern) persons from the District
when "public interest or the safety of such persons creates the necessity
therefor."' 44
In the fall of 1941 Attorney General Biddle spoke of the detention of aliens
without trial:
"The Hobbs Bill, introduced this year, authorizes, when and only as
long as deportation is impossible, detention of the alien in federal insti-
tutions. . . . The bill is in a sense revolutionary, because it permits deten-
38Brewing, Civil Liberties in Canada during Wartime (1941) 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV.
112.
239Note that only about 2,000 have been interned and over half of these have been
released. Laski, Civil Liberties in Great Britain in Wartime (1942) 2 BIL OF RIGHTS
RaV. 243; and see note 138 supra.
140 See note 9 and 10 sitpra.
141REp. ATr'y GEN. (1918) 35.
1428 BAx.z, WooDRow WILsoN, LIFE AND LranzRs (1927-1939) 100.
14316 App. D. C. 229 (1900).
'
44Pub. L. No. 373, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 26, 1941), 55 STAT. 858 (1941).
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tion without trial by jury. But where aliens cannot.be deported some
control is desirable. It is a very serious curb on civil rights made essen-
tial by the circumstances of war.' 45
The only act of Congress authorizing evacuation of internment relates solely
to aliens.' 46
It has been reported in the newspapers that several American citizens of
German ancestry have been directed by the Army to leave designated areas
on the east coast, have refused to do so, and have not been prosecuted.' 47 Can
it be that the government realizes the inability to sustain such evacuation?
Such action is even more open to criticism than "temporary mass evacuation,"
since it is only "preventive" in a technical sense. It amounts to a determina-
tion of individual guilt of ordinary civilian citizens without a hearing.
B. Factual Backgroand in Early 1942
The necessity for determining reasonableness requires the examination of
the situation-military, political, social-as it existed in early 1942, against
which background the evacuation prescribed by General DeWitt must be
tested.
No exercise of the federal police or war power has ever infringed on basic
individual rights of citizens as directly as this evacuation, without being con-
demned as in excess of constitutional authorization. Unless, therefore, there
were compelling reasons in the facts existing in early 1942 for the adoption
of a new rule, we would have to conclude that evacuation of 79,000 American
citizens from the five west coast states was an unconstitutional exercise of the
federal police power, even in time of war.
The author recognizes that the whole military situation, perhaps even the
part familiar to General DeWitt, cannot be known to the public until the end
of the war. Yet the Supreme Court must, of necessity, render its judgment
on some conception of military necessity. The government, without suggesting
that it will reveal to the Court so much of the secret information as may be
necessary to justify the evacuation, has attempted to uphold the program on
the basis of "facts known to the public."' 48 The author disclaims any knowl-
edge of military tactics, but he is impelled to the belief that if "military
necessity" is going to be decided on the basis of facts known to the public,
then when all the facts known to the public are considered, far from compelling
145Attorney General Biddle, Civil Rights inr Times of Stress (1941) 2 BILL OF RIGHTS
Rgv. 13.
14640 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. § 21 (1940).
147Case of Mrs. Schuller, N. Y. Times, May 8, 1943. See also case of Wilcox on the
west coast,, CIVIL LIBERTIES QUARTERLY, A. C. L. U., June 1943.
148See Brief for Government, Hirabayashi v. United States.
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the evacuation, they do not even support an "honest" (to use the Supreme
Court's terminology) conclusion that evacuation of these citizens was required.
1. The Government's Claim of Military Necessity.-The government's justi-
fication 148 for the west coast evacuation is based upon the Japanese successes
in the Pacific and the alleged nonassimilation of the west coast Japanese by
reason of continuous anti-Japanese agitation, and the policy of exclusion of
Japanese aliens from immigration, from the right to become naturalized, from
intermarriage, from owning land. The government points to these, to the
belief in Shintoism, the continuance of Japanese language schools in the United
States, and the possible retention of dual citizenship, and concludes that "it is
entirely possible that an unknown number of the Japanese may lack to some
extent a feeling of loyalty toward the United States as a result of their treat-
ment.' 14 9 In the footnote it is admitted, however, that "most of the evacuees
are loyal to this country."
2. Factual Background Showing Lack of Military Necessity.-
(a) The Military Background: At the same time that we were girding
ourselves for battle in the Pacific, Germany and Italy also declared war on the
United States. Both of these countries had experienced phenomenal military
successes as even the briefest chronological history will recall. Italy had over-
run Ethiopia and Albania; 115° had invaded British African colonies,' 5 '
Egypt, 52 and Greece;153 with the help of Germany had taken Crete" and
other Mediterranean islands and completed the conquest of Greece,155 thus
challenging Britain's lifeline in the Mediterranean. Germany, rising from
complete impotence in military matters in 1933, had occupied the Rhineland,
annexed Austria,'" forced upon England and France the Munich appease-
ment,157 overrun Czechoslovakia,' 58 and devastated Poland in twenty-six
days.159 She had occupied Denmark and invaded Norway, 60 crushed the
Netherlands in four days' 61 and Belgium in seventeen days ;162 had annihilated
149Brief for Government, p. 21, Hirabayashi v. United States.
15 OApril 7, 1939. Note: Details for all these footnotes may be found in the N. Y.
Times for the day given, or the day following.
151August 6, 1940.
'
52September 14, 1940.
153October 28, 1940.
154June 1, 1941.
155April 27, 1941.
'
56March 13, 1938.
157September 30, 1938.
1 8March 14, 1939.
'
5OSeptember 1-27, 1939.
16OApril 9, 1940.
161May 14, 1940.
162May 28, 1940.
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the highly ranked French army and conquered France in ten days ;103 had
launched and maintained mass air raids on England consistently for nearly
six months' 64 and had achieved a recognized superiority in the air over Eng-
land. The Nazis had taken Rumania with her rich oil wells' 5' and Bulgaria' 66
and had moved to swift victories in Greece' 67 and Crete.0 8 Turning from
England she had invaded Soviet Russia on a 2,000 mile front' 69 and had piled
victory upon victory-Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, the outskirts of Moscow,
Rostov. All these were completed immediately prior to March, 1942 ;17D and
she went on immediately to take Sevastopol, a large part of the Caucasus, and
Stalingrad.17 Surely in early 1942 the Germans seemed invincible.
Nor had the German efforts been limited to Europe. German armed ships
and submarines had terrorized our Atlantic shipping and waters within 100
miles of our east coast. We recall a few of the better known examples: the
raider Deutschland seized the S.S. City of Flint;172 the Graf Spee 7 3 and the
Columbus' 74 were scuttled off the American coast; the Robin Adair was sunk
by Nazi submarines in the South Atlantic;175 the United States Destroyer
Kearny was torpedoed off Iceland,"'0 and-the destroyer Reuben James was
torpedoed nearer our coast.-77 The number and proximity to our coast of the
sinkings became alarming by January, 1942.178 So complete was Germany's
freedom of movement in our waters that a submarine shelled the oil refineries
on Amba, in the Caribbean, on February 16, 1942, and submarines were able
to land saboteurs and quantities of explosives at two points on our coast on
June 13 and 17.179
In Africa, Rommel launched his successful drive in January, 1942, which
carried him by June to almost complete control of North Africa.8 0 The
Germans had large concentrations of planes, battleships, and submarines at
163June 3-13, 1940.
164Launched July 29, 1940; continued as heavy bombing until after January, 1941.
165Novemiber 23, 1940.
166March 1, 1941.
167April 6-27, 1941.
'68june 1, 1941.
169June 22, 1941.
170 September 20, October 14, October 17, October 25, November 22, 1941.
"7'May 11, 24, 26; July 2, 27; September 17, 1942.
172 October 23, 1939.
173December 13, 1939.
174December 19, 1939.
175 May 21, 1941.
"_
0 October 17, 1941.
"'"October 31, 1941.
17SJanuary 14, 1942.
179June 25, 1942.
iSOjanuary 21; June 21, 25, 1942.
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bases nearer to New York than are Hawaii, Kiska, or Midway to the west
coast. The roundup of two German spy and saboteur rings on the east coast
was just being completed ;181 the influence and size of the German-American
Bund were being revealed and quantities of munitions in their possession were
being seized. By comparison, our successes in the Pacific were considerably
greater than those in the Atlantic; and Japan, unable to conquer China in
seven years, was a less formidable foe than Germany with her record of con-
quest after conquest of the most difficult antagonists. Certainly there was no
clearer "military necessity" in the Pacific than there was in the Atlantic. 8 2
(b) Census Statistics: One of the reasons given for the evacuation was
the concentration of Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese
ancestry in and around the major cities of the west coast. An examination of
Table A, prepared from the census figures of 1940, shows how untenable on
this basis evacuation of the Japanese without evacuation of tle Germans and
Italians really was.8 3
The government also placed some stress on the Japanese group being one
of "late arrival" in this country with attendant exposure to Japanese indoc-
trination. Table B demonstrates no problem of "recent arrival" applicable
to the Japanese which is not equally and more applicable to the Germans.
We have already noted that the government has emphasized that the pre-
ponderance of Japanese aliens in the upper age groups made them especially
dangerous in indoctrination of the younger persons of Japanese ancestry.8 4
The unsubstantial character of this "evidence" is seen by an examination of
Table C which is a combination of figures on pages 91, 95, 236, 242, 243 of
H. R. Rep. No. 2124. In fact General DeWitt exempted the older German
and Italian aliens from his orders of evacuation. 185 We should recognize that
since 5,000 males of Japanese ancestry between 21 and 35 were in the army, 8 6
55,000 were females, 187 the alien males averaged 59 years of age,L8 8 and 31,000
evacuees were under the age of 15, the Japanese evacuation was largely of old
men, women, and children.
18 1 February 4, 1942, p. 12, col. 5; March 3, p. 13, col. 2; March 7, p. 1, col. 1; January
3, p. 1, col. 2.1 82 Brief for Government, p. 12 ff., Hirabayashi v. United States.
183 Compare the ratio of German and Italian foreign born to Japanese aliens or citizens
of German and Italian ancestry with those of Japanese ancestry. Compare also the east
coast which is as important in war material production as the west. STATE DISTRIBUTION
OF WAR SUPPLIES AND FAciLITY CoNTRAcrs, June, 1940 through December, 1941, (issued
January 18, 1942, by the O.P.M.) ; and the SUPPLEMENT, cumulative through February,
1943 (issued April 3, 1943).
'
8 4 Note 16 supra.
185H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 332.
ISOLetter of the President to the Secretary of War, February 1, 1942.
187H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 94.
18 81d, at 95.
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TABLE A
CONCENTRATION OF JAPANESE, ITALIANS, AND GERMANS BY CITIES, 1940
WEST COAST
San Oakland, Portland,
City Los Angeles Seattle Francisco Calif. Oregon Sacramento
Total population 1,191,182 368,302 634,536 302,163 305,394 105,958
Total "white"
foreign born 215,248 59,612 130,271 42,661 38,608 12,144
German foreign
born 17,528 14,977 3,682 3,947 931
Italian foreign
born 13,256 24,036 5,707 2,685 1,962
Japanese foreign
born 8,726 2,876 2,276 655 725 974
German alien 5,570 1,085 4,632 800 952 381
Italian alien 5,892 1,469 12,183 2,899 1,409 1,332
Japanese alien 8,726 2,876 2,276 655 725 974
Citizens of German
ancestryt 126,150 35,760 78,160 25,590 23,160 7,280
Citizens of Italian
ancestry' 73,180 20,264 44,302 14,500 13,120 4,120
Citizens of Japanese
ancestry 14,595 4,099 3,044 1,135 955 1,905
EAST COAST
City New York Philadelphia Baltimore Pittsburgh Chicago Detroit
-Total population 7,454,995 1,931,334 859,100 671,659 3,396,808 1,623,452
Total "white"
foreign born 2,080,020 290,325 60,969 84,606 672,705 320,664
German foreign
born 224,749 27,286 9,744 9,805 83,424 23,785
Italian foreign
born 409,489 59,079 8,063 16,241 66,472 26,277
Japanese foreign
born 1,456 * * * * *
German alien 91,240t 5,670 2,630 2,050 17,100 4,920
Italian alien 173,620-t 21,250 6,430 5,840 23,460 11,400
Japanese alien 1,456 * * * * *
Citizens of German
ancestry+ 1,248,000 174,190 36,580 50,760 404,820 192,400
Citizens of Italian
ancestry+ 707,200 98,710 20,730 28,760 228,720 109,020
Citizens of Jap-
anese ancestry 631 * * * * *
This chart is prepared from figures given in House Report No. 2124, pp. 100, 231,
233, 234, as supplemented by 16th Census of the United States, Population, Second Series
Summary, pp. 108, 156.
*Negligible numbers-less than 500 (House Report No. 2124, p. 100).
tComputed figures based on percentage relation of aliens to foreign born for each group
in the particular state (House Report No. 2124, p. 229).
*Computed figures determined by multiplying the number of "white foreign born" in
each city by the percentage (60% for the German, 34% for the Italians) showing the
relationship of persons of German or Italian ancestry to the total "white foreign born"
population of the United States (House Report No. 2124, pp. 229, 241).
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TABLE B
ALIENS RESIDENT IN THE THREE WEST COAST STATES IN 1940 BY DATE OF LAST ARRIVAL
Number who
1900 1910 1918 1935 arrived
or prior or prior or prior or prior after 1935
Italians 7.4% 41.3% 69.5% 94.5% 2,891
Japanese 3.0% 21.0% 46.7% 77.0% 6,671
Germans 11.0% 25.0% 35.0% 67.0% 7,710
This chart is prepared from House Report No. 2124, pp. 96, 235, 242.
Note: Japanese could not enter the United States for the first time after 1926 and
therefore substantially all Japanese have had American contacts for at least 17 years.
Among the Germans and Italians, the last arrival is most frequently also the first.
Note also: This chart does not show foreign born; it omits Germans and Italians who
have become naturalized, whereas no Japanese may become naturalized.
TABLE C
AGE GROUP CONCENTRATION (THREE WEST COAST STATES),
German Japanese Italian
Foreign born females over 45 yrs. 56.0% 50% 65.00%
Foreign born males over 45 yrs. 60.5% 75% 74.84%
Foreign born males over 55 yrs. 36.29% 45% 44.62%
This chart is prepared from House Report No. 2124, pp. 91, 95, 236, 242, 243.
TABLE D
RELATION OF ALIENS TO NATIVE BORN CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES
Percentage
Total native born
Japanese citizens Native born Foreign born
1910 72,157 6.2 4,502 67,655
1920 111,010 26.7 29,672 81,338
1930 138,834 49.2 68,357 70,477
1940 126,947 62.7 79,642 47,3_05
This chart is a combination of the figures given in House Report No. 2124, pp. 60,
78, 94.
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Nor can it be asserted that the Japanese group is not becoming integrated
in our society. In spite of the fact that no Japanese alien may be naturalized
and, therefore, their number remains constant, except as altered by death,
Table D shows that the percentage of native born citizens of Japanese ancestry
has steadily increased from 6.2 per cent of the total Japanese population in
1910 to 62.7 per cent in 1940.
The studies available suggest that the integration of Italians and Germans
into our culture is even slower than that of the Japanese.5 9
The Japanese on the west coast were 45 per cent agricultural; the German
and Italian aliens 3.43 per cent and 7.27 per cent agricultural and 52 per cent
unemployed; the average value of a Japanese farm in California was $12,810.190
Are these the Japanese people from whom we should anticipate the attempted
overthrow of this government which forms the only protection for the value
of their investments?
(c) Expectation of Sabotage or Fifth Column Activity and Effectiveness
of Methods Other Than Evacuation to Prevent It: On December 7, 1941, the
Territgry of Hawaii was attacked and immediately martial law was declared.
Yet at no time, though the Japanese in Hawaii constitute 38 per cent of the
total population, 19 ' has it been deemed necessary to conduct any evacuation,
and the evidence on record in the Tolan Committee Hearings at the time of
General DeWitt's orders' 92 was all to the effect that there was no sabotage
18 90n June 12, 1942, the census bureau reported that there were 3,360,740 native-born
American citizens of German ancestry for whom German was the mwther tongue. N. Y.
Times, June 13, 1942. A careful study of Italians in San Francisco and the four surround-
ing counties, in 1935, reported 193,454 individuals of Italian ancestry "more or less
directly in contact with Italian mores and habits of mind." RADIN, THE ITALIANS OF
SAN FRANCISCO (1935) SERA Project 2-F2-98, pp. 38, 64. The studies showing the
high degree of assimilation of the Japanese in the United States are of unimpeachable
merit. See the'monumental work, TheSecond-Generation Japanese Problem (1934) and
companion volumes, by Professor E. K. Strong, who concludes at p. 6: "young Japanese
are more readily assimilated than people of several European races." See also JAPAN
REvIEw, April 1921, 93 ff.; SMITH, AMERICANS IN PROCESS: A STuDY OF OUR CITIZENS
OF ORIENTAL ANCESTRY (1937); BEACH, ORIENTAL CRIME IN CALIFORNIA (1932);
MEARS, RESIDENT ORIENTALS ON THE AMERICAN PACIFIC COAST (1928).
'
190These figures are taken from H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)
pp. 88, 104, 117, 131, 135, 237, 244.
191Id. at 91.
192Stafford Austin, Chairman of all rural districts on Oahu under the Office of Civilian
Defense said: " . . . at no time prior to or subsequent to December 7, 1941, have any
signs of sabotage or subversive activities or 'blinker' signals been reported to affiant."
Id. at 51. The Attorney General informed the Tolan Committee that "Mr. John Edgar
Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has advised me there was no
sabotage committed there [Hawaii] prior to December 7, on December 7, or subsequent
to that time." Id. at 49. Henry L. Stimsdn, Secretary of War said: " . . . the War
Department has received no information of sabotage committed by Japanese during the
attack on Pearl Harbor." Id. at 48. John Burns of Honolulu, in charge of the espionage
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or fifth column activity before, during, or after Pearl Harbor and that persons
of Japanese ancestry behaved with remarkable loyalty.
The evidence of loyalty in the United States is equally clear. Persons who
should know are direct in their testimony as to the loyalty of American citizens
of Japanese ancestry in the United States. 193 Government counsel conceded,
in the circuit court of appeals in the Hirabayashi case, that there had been no
acts of sabotage or disloyalty by American citizens of Japanese ancestry. 94
Another attempt to find a justification for the evacuation of American citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry is the government's argument that these American
citizens retain a "dual citizenship" in Japan. There are five considerations
which completely dispose of any justification based upon this alleged lack of
loyalty. First, the government's position is directly contrary to and at variance
with the express statutory law of the United States and decisions of the
Supreme Court. 15 Second, every authority on international law recognizes"
the possibility of "dual citizenship" of a person born outside the country of
his parents' nationality as a result of the two systems of law for determining
citizenship: place of birth (jus soli) and ancestry or descent (jus sanguinlis),
since nearly all countries employ both systems. 96 Third, it needs to be said
that Japan has gone farther in surrendering its claim to allegiance from per-
sons of Japanese ancestry born elsewhere than in Japan than has, almost any
other country, certainly much farther than Germany and Italy.197 Fourth,
bureau, working with the office of military intelligence and F. B. I., summarized his
investigations: "... there has not been either on or since December 7 any authenticated
case of sabotage or any authenticated case of group activity on behalf of Japan on the
part of persons of Japanese ancestry, citizen or alien, residing on the Island of Oahu."
Id. at 58.
193The New Year's 1942 edition of the Pacific Citizen is made up almost entirely of
statements by political and other leaders on the west coast attesting to this loyalty.
Milton Eisenhower, then Director of the War Relocation Authority, had no difficulty in
recognizing 85 per cent of the American born as loyal. (Testimony before House Sub-
committee on Appropriations, June 15, 1942.)
19 4Brief for Hirabayashi, p. 6, Hirabayashi v. United States.
'
95 REv. STAT. § 1999 (1875), 8 U. S. C. § 800 (1940) ; 54 STAT. 1168, 8 U. S: C. § 801
(1940) ; and United States v. Wong'Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456 (1897).
19 0Flourney (assistant solicitor in the Department of State), Dual Nationality and
Election (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 545; 3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1906) 518-751; STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1931) 190-91; HYDE, INTERNA-
"TIONAL LAW CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES (1922) 658,
666-669; BORCHARD, THE DIPLOmATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1927) 18-19,
550-580. MooRE, THE DOCTRINE OF EXPATRIATION (1905) 234-236; BORCHARD, THE
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1927) 19. Our chief struggles as to dual
allegiance have been with European nations, some of which absolutely refuse expatriation,
and some of which require permission for expatriation and fulfillment of military service
requirements. BORCHARD, op. cit. supra, at 546; MOORE, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1905)
190-91.
19 7Prior to 1885 Japan forbade all immigration. In 1899 Japan enacted the first
nationality law, which adopted the European rule of jis sangunis. Expatriation under
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against great odds and at considerable cost to themselves, American citizens
of Japanese ancestry have, to a degree not shown by any other "foreign"
group, surrendered any claim to Japanese citizenship.' 98 Fifth, even if dual
citizenship did exist in theory, it is recognized by international law that in
fact only the nation of domicile is effective in claiming the person's allegiance.' 99
Considerable point has been made of the attendance of children of Japanese
parents at Japanese language schools, implying that these are something unique
in this country and hotbeds of Japanese indoctrination.20 One who advances
this argument must be unmindful of constitutional history. Meyer v.
Nebraska201 and Bartels v. Iowa 202 certainly recognized the right to teach
German in a school. It is only necessary to read quickly what studies have
been made of the Japanese language schools to be clear in several conclusions,
all of which definitely disprove any subversive influence or disloyalty of these
schools. Similar schools are conducted by Chinese, Germans, and others.2° 3
The Japanese schools were originally formed either to teach Christianity or
to expedite the Americanization of the Japanese. -104 They form a necessary
part of fitting the young people for vocations, since anti-Japanese agitation
this law was possible but difficult. The Japanese associations in the United States from
1914 to 1923 petitioned the Japanese government to facilitate expatriation. Finally, in
1924, Imperial Ordinance No. 262 conceded American citizenship to any person born in
the United States of Japanese parents and denied to him Japanese citizenship unless
within 14 days of birth he is registered by his parents. All impartial observers recognize
that far from Japan having "made every effort" (through the doctrine of dual citizenship)
to retain the allegiance of the American Japanese, as the government asserts at p. 12
of the Yasui brief (Brief for Government, p. 12, Yasui v. United States) it has in fact
been the most liberal of governments in surrendering that allegiance. See for a recog-
nition of this and the laws here summarized: STRONG, JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA (1933)
45-47; KiYo SUE INUI, THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC (1927) 300-320;
WILLIAM C. SMITH, AMERICANS IN PROCESS: A STUDY OF OUR CITIZENS OF ORIENTAL
ANCESTRY '(1937) 132-137; FLOURNOY AND HUDSON, A COLLECTION OF NATIONALITY
LAWS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES (1929) 385-387; KIYOSHI K. KAWAKAMI, THE REAL
JAPANESE QUESTION (1921) 174-187. YAMAMOTO ICHIHASHI, THE JAPANESE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1932) 323; MEARS, RESIDENT ORIENTALS ON THE AMERICAN PACIFIC
COAST (1928) 107-11; 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1924) 412.
19SEven before 1924 when the Japanese law required the registration of every child with
the Japanese consul and the children were automatically citizens, Raymond Leslie Buell
found that only two-thirds were being registered. Buell, Some Legal Aspects of the
Japanese Question (1923) 17 AM. J. INT. L. 29, 34.
1 9 9BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 196, at 589; 3 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1906) 518; STOWE.L, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1931) 187; R. W. Flournoy, Revision
of Nationality Laws of the United States (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 43-44.2 0 OBrief for Government, pp. 28-31, Hirabayashi v. United States.
201262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1922).
202262 U. S. 404, 43 Sup. Ct. 628 (1922).
2 03 PALMER, ORIENTALS IN AMERICAN LIFE (1934) 51.
204Colket, Suppressing Japanese Schools in Hawaii, The Nation, November 22, 1922;
W. C. SMITH, AMERICANS IN THE MAKING (1939) 302; BELL, PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION
OF SECOND-GENERATION JAPANESE (1935) 20; and REUTER, RACE AND CULTURE CON-
TRACTS (1934).
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requires them to work for Japanese.20 5 The splendid record of the Japanese
for honesty, good citizenship, lack of disorganization and demoralization is
directly traced to these schools.2 0 6 Impartial research categorically denies that
they are intended to perpetuate the traditions or policies of Japan and verifies
the cooperation of these schools in selecting textbooks and courses of study
"which correspond to the spirit of Americanism. '20 7
Shintoism as "loyalty to the emperor" seems to have been overemphasized.
The brief, amicus curiae, of the Japanese American Citizens League shows that
pictures of Washington or Lincoln were sometimes hung in a Shinto temple
and revered as forefathers who had contributed greatly to human advancement,
and that the majority of Japanese American citizens were in fact Christian.2 0 8
There is respectable evidence to the effect that there would have been no
substantial danger of civil disorder had the Japanese been left on the west
coast ;209 and that the evacuation has been detrimental to productive war
capacity,2'10 thus not only failing to be a "military necessity" but proving to
be a military "blunder."
When the final history of the Japanese evacuation is written, it will almost
certainly appear that decisions were made on misinformation, assumptions,
prejudices, half truths, when excellent, scientifically accurate material was
available.2
11
I make no apology for the detailed examination of facts, for constitutional
issues are now largely problems of socil justice and degree. On the basis
of the known facts the author cannot conclude that the military situation orC
conditions on the west coast in early 1942 could honestly be deemed to require
20 Marian Svensrud, Attitudes of the Japanese Toward Their Language Schools (1933)
17 SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 259-264; STRONG, THE SECOND-GENERATION JAP-
ANESE PROBLEM (1934) 6; MEARS, RESIDENT ORIENTALS ON THE AMERICAN PACIFIC
COAST (1928) 358; and Stearns, History of the Japanese People in California, Thesis
Series 4, University of Oregon (1937).20 6SMITH, AMERICANS IN THE MAKING (1939) 302; BELL, op. cit. supra note 204, at 106.
20 7 BELL, op. cit. smpra note 204, at 20-24; SvENSRUD, op. cit. supra note 205; MILLIS,
THE JAPANESE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1915) 265; and YAmATO ICHIHASHI,
op. cit. supra note 197.2 0SBrief for Japanese American Citizens League, Amic s Curiae, pp. 49-53, Hirabayashi
v. United States.2091d. at 53-60.
21od. at 115-125.
21
'Typical of the misinformation are the following: Senator Johnson said: " . . . we
have 130,000 Japanese, 30,000 of whom are citizens." 88 CONG. REC., FEBRUARY 17, 1942,
1371. Representative Ford said: "Every child of Japanese parentage, born in the States
... is still a citizen of Japan." 88 CoNG. REC., February 18, 1942, 1458. There is some
evidence that the demand for evacuation came from certain professional anti-orientals
and selfish economic groups. Frank Taylor, The People Nobody Wants, Sat. Eve. Post,
May 9, 1943, 24; Tolan Committee Hearings, 11, 242, 11432. This article refers to only
a small portion of the accurate material available; see the Congressional Library cata-
logue- in Washington for considerable additional material.
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evacuation of 79,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry, as a matter of
"military necessity" or .otherwise. The very foundation of upholding the
evacuation and internment as an exercise of the federal police power, therefore,
must fail.
C. If Evacuation Was Justified, Was the Method Employed Constitutional?
Although our conclusion has been that the situation in early 1942 did not
justify the federal government in authorizing the evacuation program under
any of its powers, we now approach the next issue as though the program
could have been sustained if the proper authorization and procedure were
followed.
1. Prelinzinavy Issues.-There are several arguments debated by counsel for
the government and counsel for the evacuees which need to be disposed of
before facing the major issues. The first involves the question whether either
as Commander in Chief or under his power to enforce the laws, the President
could carry out the evacuation without congressional authorization; and if not,
did Congress properly authorize the President and the military commanders
to carry forward the program. That the President has asserted "war powers"
other than those derived from congressional empowerment or the direct pro-
visions of the Constitution cannot be doubted.21 2 Lincoln took a somewhat
similar position, but the Supreme Court has never sustained this claim. In
the Prize Cases Congress had ratified the earlier acfion taken by Lincoln, and
the Court cupheld the blockade on the basis of congressional action.213 The
position of the government is not confirmed by any of the authoritative text
writers on presidential power214 or'by the decisions of the Supreme Court,
which expressly held in Brozw v. United States21' that the President did not
have the right to seize alien enemy property when Congress had only empow-
ered him to detain alien enemies. Nor does it appear that the executive action
can be sustained without congressional authorization on the basis of the
President's power under Article II, Section 3, of the Constitution to see that
212See the President's Labor Day address to Congress asking the repeal of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act: "In the event that the Congress should fail to act; and act
adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act . . .When the war is won,
the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people-to whom they belong."
And see preamble to Executive Order No. 9066, Feb. 21, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 1407 (1942).
2132 Black 635, 671 (U. S. 1862).
2 14 RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926) ; CORwiN, THE PREs-
IDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (1940) ; and BFRDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE ExECUTIVE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1921).
2158 Cranch 110 (U. S. 1814). See also Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866);
and the dissent in Litther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849), considered a classic on
"War Powers."
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the laws are faithfully executed.2 16 As to the evacuation of "citizens," there
was no law which the President could "execute. 217
Congressional authorization or ratification is extremely difficult to spell out
in this case.2 18 None of the actions taken prior to March 21, when Public
Law No. 503 was adopted by Congress, had suggested that evacuation of any
"loyal citizens" was to take place. Not only was Congress advised that
executive evacuation under the existing congressional laws could not apply
to citizens, but it refused to pass an express authorization for evacuation of
all Japanese. Public Law No. 503 should be interpreted as punishing only
those who refused to obey a constitutional order. The attempt to find rati-
fication in the appropriation of money to care for the evacuees in the Congres-
sional Appropriation Act of July 25, 1942, is a "grasping at straw" argument
since obviously whether properly or improperly evacuated the government
had to care for them. That Congress could have authorized or ratified execu-
tive action is well recognized.2 1 9
2. Delegation of Legislative Power.-If it be assumed that Public Law No.
503 constituted congressional authorization, does that law stand the test of
constitutionality? At its head are leveled two criticisms: (1) the act uncon-
stitutionally delegates legislative authority; and (2) for a criminal law the
statute is too indefinite. Although the limits placed upon delegation of legis-
lative authority in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan01° and the Schechter case221
are recognized, it is the author's belief that the delegation here involved would
be upheld. It could be argued from the circumstances surrounding its enact-
ment that the law clearly shows the general policy (protection of military
areas) and a primary standard (the prevention of any act which might un-
reasonably hamper the war effort). All cases recognize that Congress need
only legislate "as far as was reasonably practicable." 222 It is certainly true
that great discretion may be lodged in the executive in the fields of foreign
216The cases relied upon are In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1894) ; In re
Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658 (1890) ; and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879).217See concession of the government, Brief for Government, p. 51, Yasui v. United
States.StaSee notes 14, 13-29 supra for proof of following statements.
219Mitchell v. Clarke, 110 U. S. 633, 4 Sup, Ct. 170 (1884) ; Graham v. Goodcell, 282
U. S. 409, 51 Sup. Ct. 186 (1930); Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297,
301, 57 Sup. Ct. 478, 479 (1936); and particularly Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549, 556,
33 Sup. Ct. 585, 586 (1912) (upholding legislative ratification of a prior executive
deportation).
220293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1934).221A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837
(1934).222United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 1 (1926) ; and Red
"C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380, 394, 32 Sup. Ct. 152, 156 (1911).
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relations and war where decisions have to be made on "confidential informa-
tion. ' 223 Senator Taft was right in characterizing Public Law No. 503 as a
"sloppy" criminal law, but appellants' argument of indefiniteness fails to take
into account that if Congress had fixed the general standard and properly
authorized administrative agencies to fill in the details, the indefiniteness of
the definition of the acts made criminal must inhere in the regulations, as well
as the law. 22 4 The cases in which statutes were clearly indefinite and were
not made definite by regulations are not applicable.22 5 Although the words
"any act" in Public Law No. 503, and "any or all persons" or "military areas"
in Executive Order No. 9066 seem indefinite, a construction which would
interpret these in the light of the preamble of Executive Order No. 9066 as
reasonably related to "espionage or sabotage" would seem sound. United
States v. Grimaud226 recognized the right of Congress to make the violation
of the Secretary of Agriculture's regulations, not yet issued, a misdemeanor.
3. Due Process.-There are, however, other more serious objections to the
method employed in the evacuation regardless of whether congressional
authorization was necessary or given. Did the program lack "due process"
either by reason of improper discriminiation or lack of hearing? It neither
advances our discussion nor does it sound convincing in the mouth of the
government to assert that the fifth, unlike the fourteenth amendment, contains
no "equal protection" clause, even though the Supreme Court has used this
language on countless occasions.2 27 Equal protection before the law is the
223United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 Sup. Ct. 216
(1936); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 1 (1926);
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502 (1918) ; Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367 (1906); Field & Co. v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495 (1891) ; and The Thomas Gibbons, 8 Cranch 420(U. S. 1814).224United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 12 Sup. Ct. 764 (1891) (recognizing the
right of Congress to make the violation of an administrative regulation a crime) ; United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 Sup. Ct. 216 (1936) (a criminal
law imposing a penalty for selling arms) ; McKinley v. United States, 249 U. S. 397,
39 Sup. Ct. 324 (1918) (a criminal law whereby an administrative officer prescribed the
area around army camps from which prostitutes were excluded) ; Gorin v. United States,
312 U. S. 19, 61 Sup. Ct. 429 (1940) ; Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 468
(1937); and Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 534,
57 Sup. Ct. 277 (1936).2 25 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 59 Sup. Ct. 618 (1936) ; Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 Sup. Ct. 126 (1925) ; and United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298 (1920).
226220 U.,S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1910).
2 27 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329, 63 Sup. Ct. 297 (1943); Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 401, 60 Sup. Ct. 907, 916 (1939) ; Currin
v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 14, 16, 59 Sup. Ct. 379, 386, 387 (1938) ; United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 151, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 783 (1937) ; Stewart Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 584, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1930) ; and LaBell Iron Works v. United
States, 256 U. S. 377, 392, 41 Sup. Ct. 528, 532 (1920).
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very warp and woof of our Federal System ;228 the' President has declared
racial discrimination abhorrent to our institutions2 9 and has said that "we are
fighting, as our fathers have fought, to uphold the doctrine that all men are
created equal in the sight of God" ;2o congressional acts of long standing have
expressly forbidden discrimination based on race or color ;21 and even in the
cases where a distinction between the fifth and fourteenth amendments has
been stated, I do not find the court approving federal action which would not
have been upheld under the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment as state action.2 32
The rules of permissible classification should perhaps be restated. A reason-
able and causal relationship not based on conjecture must be shown between
the basis of classification and a proper object to be accomplished.233 The class
may be limited in its scope and not cover every possible source of danger; the
limits may be determined by degree of evil or danger, but the classification
should operate equally upon all in like circumstances.23 4 A practical classifi-
cation may be sustained though lacking in scientific exactness or uniformity.2 5
22 8DECLAPATION OF INDEPENDENCE, par. 2; Preamble to U. S. CONST.; U. S. CONST.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 and 2, § 3, cl. 1 and 3, § 9, cl. 3, 4, and 8; Art. II, § 1, cl. 3 and 5;
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, § 4; U. S. CoNsT. Amend. I to X, XIII, XIV, XV, X1X. Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 332, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 129 (1921).229Exec. Order No. 8802, June 25, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 3109 (1941).23OWar and Peace Aims, Special Supplement No. 1, UNITED NATioNS RxvlEw, January
30, 1943, 6.
231Rv. STAT. §§ 1977-79 (1875), 8 U. S. C. §§ 41, 42, 43 (1940); 35 STAT. 1092
(1909), 18 U. S. C. §§ 51, 52 (1940).232See note 227 supra, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct.
883 (1930) upheld the Federal Social Security System; similar state action was also
upheld. W. H. Chamberlin v. Andrews, Ind. Comm., 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22
(1936), aft'd, 299 U. S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936). The Court has also said that the
same protection is afforded under "due process" as under "equal protection." Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 326, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 361 (1931) ; Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S.
582, 51 Sup. Ct. 306 (1930); and Sims v. Rives, 84 F. (2d) 871 (App. D. C., 1936),
cert. den. 298 U. S. 682, 56 Sup. Ct. 960 (1936).2 33 Hartford Steam Boiler Insp. & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U. S. 459, 57 Sup. Ct. 838
(1936) ; West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1936) ; Mayflower
Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266, 56 Sup. Ct. 457 (1935) ; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 38 Sup. Ct. 495 (1917) ; Chicago Dock and Canal Co. v. Fraley,
228 U. S. 680, 33 Sup. Ct. 715 (1912) ; and Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. Co. v.
Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 19 Sup. Ct. 609 (1898). Compare GrosieanT v. American Press
Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1935) where the number of outlets had no proper
relation to the result to be accomplished with State Board of Tax Commissioners v.
Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1930) where it did.2 34 State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540
(1930); Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct. 57 (1929); Farmers & M. Bank
v. Federal Reserve, 262 U. S. 649, 43 Sup. Ct. 651 (1922) ; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217 (1916) ; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 35 Sup. Ct. 342
(1914) ; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913) ; and Barbier v.
Connelly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357 (1884).
235Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 595 (1931) ; Chi-
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A margin of error is allowed, and the mere fact that some incidental innocent
articles or transactions may be found in the class will not upset the plan.2 6
Although aliens, like citizens, are entitled in time of peace to the equal pro-
tection of the laws, alienage may have a reasonable ielationship to a proper
object so as to form a proper basis of classification.2 7 'There is a presumption
of reasonableness of classification.238
In a strict sense the classification here is not on a basis of race, for all
Chinese, Japanese, Pacific islanders, and Indians are of.the same race,23 9 but
is a segregation on nationality of forebears. Yet, in a real sense the criterion is
race; for the .basic assumption is made that the portion -of our citizenry
descending from Mongolians who are our enemies may be disloyal, but those
descending from "white" enemies are not. I would not agree that race may
never be made the subject of valid classification ;240 but it can be asserted with
some finality that to the problem of "defense" race has no reasonable relation-
ship. The concurring opinion of Justices Douglas and Jackson in the
Edwards case2 4 1 has stated: "we should say now, and in no uncertain terms,
that a man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state
to test, qualify or limit his right as a citizen of the United States ... the mere
state of being without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance,
like race, creed, or color." This is in accord with a long line of cases which
hold that thus far we have never found a situation in which race is a proper
basis of classification.2 42 Just as race has no bearing on a person's tendency to
cago Dock and Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 33 Sup. Ct. 715 (1912) ; Mutual Loan
Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup. Ct. 74 (1911) ; and Orient Iisurance Co. v. Daggs,
172 U. S. 557, 19 Sup. Ct. 281 (1898).23 6Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926) ; Jacob Rup-
pert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (1919) ; and Purity Extract & Tonic Co.
v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct. 44 (1912).
23TClarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1926) (operation of pool
room) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923) (ownership of land) ;
Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195, 36 Sup. Ct. 83 (1915) (employing aliens on public
work) ; and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S.. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913) (shooting
wild life).238United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 58 Sup. Ct. 788 (1937);
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 55 Sup. Ct. 187 (1934) ; Silver v.
Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct. 57 (19Z9) ; and Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392,
47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1926).2 39KROEBER, KINSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES (1921) 47; KROEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY (1923)
44; LINTON, THE STUDY OF MAN (1936) 43; STIBBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (1930) 160; and, Ales Hrdlicka, No Certain Way to Tell Japawese from
Chinese (1941) 40 SCIENCE NEws LETTER 394.
240An example could be imagined wherein, one race had such a higher percentage of
leprosy cases that members of that race could be compelled to submit to examination or
other means of eradication of the disease: If some characteristic of the race made it more
susceptible, the race would form a basis of classification.2 4IEdwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164 (1941).2 4 2Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232 (1938); Yu Cong
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sabotage or disloyalty, so neither nationality of forebears nor even former
nationality of, the person is pertinent.243
An equally critical omission of the evacuation program was the failure to
afford hearings to determine the necessity for moving or confining any indi-
vidual. If the Supreme Court ever intended, in Whitney v. California,244 to
restrict a person's rights on the theory of "guilt by association" it has certainly
now reversed its position and required a determination of individual guilt or
innocence.2 45 It has also always been a cardinal principle that before any
individual can be confined, punished, or even deprived of valued rights, a fair
hearing must be accorded and personal guilt or obligation ascertained.240
Although an army intelligence officer has made a report finding 75 per cent
of the Japanese on the west coast loyal and advocating individual examina-
tions ;247 although the advisability of individual hearings was recognized in
the Tolan reports ;248 although individual hearings were accorded aliens other
than Japanese 249 and the vast group of Italian aliens and Italian citizens was
cleared of disloyalty by October, 1942,250 and German aliens were permitted
to return to the west coast by July;251 although the English experience of
73,353 hearings in six months resulting in 569 persons interned, 6,782 re,
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500, 528, 46 Sup. Ct. 619, 627 (1925) ; Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16
(1917) ; and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886). Cases like
Gong Lure v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 48 Sup. Ct. 91 (1927) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138 (1895) which permits segregation if the colored race is
given equal accommodations are decided on the basis that where there is equality there
is no discrimination.2431n United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456 (1897), it was -
declared that Congress had no authority "to restrict the effective birth, declared by the
Constitution to constitute sufficient and complete right to ciizenship on the basis of
nationality of the parents." And in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541, 62 Sup. Ct.
1110, 1113 (1941) the Court said: " . . . when the law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not
the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race,
or nationality for oppressive treatment." In Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 63 Sup. Ct.
115 (1943) the Court was unwilling to assume disloyalty, even of an aliem Japanese.
244274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1926).
245Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S.
242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732 (1936) ; and Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255
(1936).2 4 0CHASFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 470-485. Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. S. 535, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110 (1941) ; Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1,
14, 58 Sup. Ct. 773, 776 (1937) ; Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1926) ;
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921) ; and Hurtado v. California,
110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111 (1884).247Harper's Magazine, October, 1942, 489.
248H. R. REPS. No. 1911, 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
249See note 14 supra.2 5oStatement of Attorney General, October 12, Order October 14, 1942.251See note 14 smpra.
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stricted, and 64,254 freed completely was known,252 and although the army
was able to test loyalty individually when it inducted evacuees into. the army,253
it was unable to stop long enough in March, 1942, to permit of individual
hearings to test the loyalty of American citizens. That greater consideration
should be accorded aliens than citizens is a bitter pill for any citizen to swallow.
Even if congressional action and the orders of the President were legal, the
action of General DeWitt would constitute administration "by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand" so as to deprive the whole evacuation
program of constitutional validity.2 54
D. The Problem of Detention
Although strictly beyond the scope of this article, brief reference should be
made to the continued detention of the evacuees.2 55 Detention stands on less
firm ground from the beginning than does evacuation for neither congressional
act nor executive order. authorize detention ;236 and it rests, therefore, solely
on General DeWitt's orders. Further, even if evacuation were legal, it is so
only on the theory that it was "preventive," not "punitive,"2 57 and was em-
ployed to gain time necessary to determine whether there were any specific
persons of Japanese ancestry whose presence on the west coast would be
dangerous. It was, as Professor Cushman has remarked,2 8 a vast quarantine
program falling alike on those who have or may have been exposed to a
disease, justifiable only for such time as would permit of individual examina-
tions. But the facts demonstrate that evacuation has been used otherwise than
as "preventive." Although citizens of Japanese ancestry have proved most
cooperative in camps,2 59 and detention centers have been recognized as mis-
takes, 260 only a few individual hearings, though practicable for the entire
group, have been held. Regulations (requiring a job, sponsor, distance from
war facilities, etc.) at present make it virtually impossible for very many to
be resettled in ordinary civilian life; General DeWitt and some west coast
congressmen have been making it clear that the evacuees will not return to
252H. R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 280-281.
2 53 See note 193 supra.254yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886).
255A word of appreciation should be spoken concerning the efforts of the War Reloca-
tion Authority, which seems to have done an excellent job against the most trying
opposition.256See Exec. Order No. 9066, Feb. 21, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 1407 (1942).2 7 Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 55 HA v.
L. REv. 1253, at 1302.258Cushman, Our Interited Citizens: The Problem of Japanese Evacuation (1943) 23
B. U. L. REv. -.
259See statements of Milton S. Eisenhower and Edward J. Ennis. Brief for the
Japanese American Citizens League, amicus curiae, p. 8, Hirabayashi v. United States.260See note 41 supra.
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the west coast alive .2 0 David Reisman, in an excellent article,2 2 has empha-
sized that the protection of civil liberties now depends upon an aggressive
willingness of individuals to use the processes of government and their own
abilities to prevent those inimical to civil liberties from using governmental
processes to suppress liberties. Let us be fair and admit that our hasty action
has left us with a difficult problem on our hands and that even if evacuation
could be supported, detention cannot. We, therefore, should be prompt in
making good to these citizens their loss from improper detention. Make it
good in dollars and cents, yes; and in willingness to arrange for their discharge
from camps and also to help them found new homes.
E. Miscellaneous Objections to Evacuation
Certain other objections to the evacuation program should be noted though
space will not permit an analysis of them.
1. Construction Treason.-A tenable case can be made against the evacuation
program as being the equivalent of constructive treason. The argument would
run something like this: evacuation and detention were in the nature of
punishment; espionage or sabotage, or disloyalty to the government constitutes
treason. The Constitution specifies how treason shall be proved and that guilt
shall not work corruption of blood to the person's descendants; the United
States in the trial of Aaron Burr and in Ex parte Bollnwn,263 rejected the
doctrine of "constructive treason" by which a person could be punished as
though for treason without a trial. The confinement of citizens of Japanese
ancestry either amounts to assuming treason of the parents (aliens) and
working a corruption of blood, or to "constructive treason."
2. Bill of Attabider.-Of similar type is the argument that evacuation oper-
ated as a bill of attainder in violation of Article I, section 9, clause 3. In the
Test Oath Cases,264 (civil war) the court held that to deprive a person of
any basic rights as a citizen (such as right to office) on the basis of his former
sympathy with the enemy, was unconstitutional as a bill of attainder. To
deprive a citizen of his rights because of his ancestry, which is a "past fact"
over which he has no control, is of the same nature.
3. Slavery and Invohntary Sdrvitude.-The government claims that the
evacuation is not punishment for crime. There is considerable evidence to
show that the evacuees have been made to work at substantially less than the
261Reply brief for Hirabayashi, appendix, Hirabayashi v. United States.202Reisman, Civil Liberties in1 a Period of Transition (1942) 3 PUBLIC POLICY 33-96.
2634 Cranch 75 (U. S. 1807).
2044 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
1943]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
regular pay available in private employment 265 and that they have been per-
mitted to work only where assigned by the government. The only compulsory
service for the government which has ever been considered legal has been
service in the armed forces, on jury, in repair of roads, and in similar service.
III. THE POSITION OF THE ALIEN JAPANESE
Because I cannot agree with the position expressed in nearly all articles
to date that "so far as enemy aliens are affected, no constitutional question is
presented, ' ' 266 I shall make brief reference to the alien problem. I recognize
that the war power within constitutional limits is as to the alien almost plenary.
That disposes of any objection under sections IIA and IIB of this article. It
does not answer the issue raised in IC. The right to classify on the basis of
alienage demands that alienage shall have a proper relation to the purpose
to be accomplished. The purpose here is to prevent disloyal activities. The
government has conceded that "alien Japanese individually conceived to be
dangerous to the safety of the country have been apprehended and interned.' 2617
Internment of other Japanese aliens could have no reasonable relation to safety.
This, together with the discriminatory treatment accorded alien Japanese, as
compared to Germans and Italians, may yet require the holding that the
evacuation failed to accord alien Japanese the rights guaranteed them, as
recently as 1942, by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Kawato,268 and admirably
summarized with extensive citation by Reuben Oppenheimer.269
IV. CoNcLusIoN
Some may wish to shave off all nonessential protrusions from the stream-
lined war machine so that nothing may interfere with the speed of its progress.
They forget that some of the things they term "gadgets" will be helpful, if
not indispensable, when the machine gets its destination-in fact, the trip may
well have been futile without them. The history of America has been one of
jealously guarding the civil liberties of its people, even at the price of reduc-
tion in speed of its governmental or war machine.
If we would, therefore, preserve those principles which this country has
designated its "war aims,"- then it would appear that the evacuation cannot
be upheld.
265H. R. RFE. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
266Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 55 HARv.
L. RE V. 1253, 1301; Comment, Alien Enemies and Japawese Americans (1942) 51 YALE
L. J. .1316, 1322; and Cushman, Our Interned Citizens: The Problem of Japanese Evac-
uation (1943) 23 B. U. L. Rzv. -267Brief for Government, p: 51, Yasui v. United States. The reports of the F. B. I.
are to the same effect. ANNUAL REP. F. B. I. (1941) ; ANNUAL REP. F. B. I. (1942).
268317 U. S. 69, 63 Sup. Ct. 115 (1943).
2 69Oppenheimer, The Constitutional Rights of Aliens (1941) 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REvIEw
- 100 ff.
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